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This paper proposes that managerial incentive compensation affects the firm choice between public and bank debt. 
To motivate the case I analyze a simple model with complete and perfect information that implies a positive relation 
between managers’ incentive compensation and preference toward bank debt. Using firm-level data over the period 
1992-2005, I empirically examine the relation between managerial incentives and financing decisions. Specifically, I 
examine whether managers whose compensation is tied to firm performance choose bank over public debt as a 
commitment mechanism to reduce the cost of debt. Consistent with a monitoring role of banks, I find that the 
probability of choosing bank over public debt is positively related to the level of incentive compensation. Further, I 
find that public lenders price the incentive alignment between manager and shareholders by increasing the cost of 
debt, while the overall cost of bank loan does not depend on the manager’s incentive compensation. Finally, I find 
that banks are more likely to include a collateral provision in the debt contract if the manager’s compensation is tied 
to firm performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: G32, G34, J33, D82. 
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1. Introduction 
Bank loans and public bonds are today the main source of external financing for U.S. 
corporations. According to the Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, at the end of the fourth 
quarter of 2007 the net flows from non-financial non-farm corporate bonds and bank loans were $509.5 
billion, while the net flow from new equity issues was a negative $1,157.6 billion. Net flows from new 
equity issues have been consistently negative in the past 10 years. Due to the importance of debt as a 
financing source for U.S. corporations, it is important to understand the determinants of the firm debt 
structure decisions. In this paper, I try to contribute with both theory and evidence. I develop a simple 
theoretical model of the role of managerial incentives on the choice between public and bank debt, and 
present strong empirical evidence that the manager’s incentive compensation is a determinant of the firm 
financing choices. 
This paper proposes that managers’ compensation structure affects the firm choice between 
public and bank debt. To motivate this case I develop a simple dynamic model with complete and perfect 
information where shareholders cannot directly control the firm financing and investing decisions, but 
rely on managers’ choices. Tying compensation to stock performance aligns managers’ and shareholders’ 
preferences, but it also provides managers with the incentive to benefit shareholders at the expense of 
lenders by substituting risky assets for safe ones. Lenders cannot observe managers’ investing choices, 
but they can anticipate the asset substitution incentives and demand a higher return, thereby imposing a 
cost on the firm. Banks, as opposed to public lenders, can monitor managers’ investing choices by 
receiving a costly signal. Thus, they can prohibit managers from investing in risky projects, and punish 
the firm if a violation of this provision is detected. The probability of being detected and the extent of the 
punishment limit managers’ incentives to engage in asset substitution activities. Banks can also limit 
managers’ risk-shifting incentives by collateralizing the loan. Rational lenders anticipate that the 
incentives for asset substitution are weaker and require a lower rate. The model predicts that managers 
whose compensation is tied to firm performance choose bank loans and submit to bank monitoring as a 
commitment mechanism to reduce the cost of debt. 
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The main results of this paper are empirical. Three hypotheses can be built from the model. First, 
managers whose interests are aligned with shareholders’ through incentive compensation commit to limit 
asset substitution activities by submitting to bank monitoring to reduce the firm financing costs.  Second, 
bondholders increase the cost of debt to be compensated for the asset substitution incentives of an aligned 
manager, while banks monitor the firm to limit managers’ incentives. Finally, banks are more likely to 
include a collateral provision in the debt contract if the manager’s compensation is tied to firm 
performance. I gather firm-level data on 631 bank loans and 1567 straight bonds over the period 1992-
2005 and study the effect of managers’ Pay-Performance-Sensitivity on firm choice between public and 
bank debt, borrowing costs, and inclusion of a collateral provision in the debt contract. I find evidence 
that a manager with high Pay-Performance-Sensitivity prefers bank over public debt. I also find that 
bondholders charge a higher interest rate to managers with high Pay-Performance-Sensitivity, while the 
overall cost of loans does not depend on the manager’s incentive compensation. Finally, I find that banks 
include a collateral provision in the debt contract more often if the manager’s Pay-Performance-
Sensitivity is high. 
The article is organized as follows: in Section 2 I review the literature; in Section 3, I develop the 
model; in Section 4 I describe the data. In Sections 5 and 6 I test my hypotheses; Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
My paper is directly related to research describing the effect of incentive compensation on the 
choice of the firm financing sources (see, e.g., Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1993; Zwiebel, 1996; 
Almazan and Suarez, 2003; Denis and Mihov, 2003; Khurana, Nejadmalayeri, and Pereira, 2005). I show 
that managers whose compensation is tied to firm performance have incentives to engage in asset 
substitution activities; also, I show that aligned managers commit to avoid risk-shifting activities by 
choosing bank over public debt. My study contributes to this literature by presenting strong evidence that 
manager’s incentive compensation is a determinant of the choice of the firm financing sources, and by 
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providing an alternative explanation of the link between managerial incentive compensation and 
preference for bank debt.  
My paper combines ingredients from different strands of the literature. The intuition behind the 
relation between asset substitution and incentive compensation comes from a strand of literature (see, e.g., 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Galai and Masulis, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Parrino and Weisbach, 
1999) that shows that shareholders of a levered firm have incentives to substitute safe assets with risky 
ones to expropriate lenders. Additionally, Amihud and Lev (1981) show that the preferences of the person 
in charge of the firm financing and investing decisions, the manager, are not necessarily aligned with the 
preferences of the firm owners. There are recent empirical papers (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 
2001; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001) that find evidence consistent with the intuition that the asset substitution 
problem is more severe when the manager’s compensation is tied to firm performance. 
My paper also builds on the insights of theoretical (see, e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977; Diamond, 
1984; Fama, 1985; Berlin and Loeys, 1988; Yosha, 1993; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994) and empirical 
papers (see, e.g., Houston and James, 1996; Johnson, 1997a and 1997b; Cantillo and Wright, 2000; 
Santos and Winton, 2005) that investigate the role of banks as information producers. More specifically, I 
follow the literature that examines the role of banks as ex-post monitors of the firm actions (see, e.g., 
Mayers, 1977; Diamond, 1991; Rajan, 1992). This choice is supported by empirical research that presents 
evidence of the banks’ ability to reduce ex-post information asymmetries through monitoring (see, e.g., 
Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam, 1999; Liu, 2004), and the monitoring ability of banks with 
respect to public debt (see, e.g., Best and Zhang, 1993; Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Patel, 1999). 
This paper also contributes to the research on the determinants of borrowing costs. Empirical 
studies (see, e.g., Dennis, Nandy, Sharpe, 2000; John, Lynch, and Puri, 2003; Gottesman and Roberts, 
2004; Booth and Booth, 2006) examine the impact of borrower and bank characteristics and loan features 
on loan pricing. There are papers (see, e.g., Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Cremers, Nair, and Wei, 2004; 
Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2005) that examine the effect of board composition, presence of institutional 
investors and takeover vulnerability on bond yields. Ortiz-Molina (2005) investigates the hypothesis of a 
 9 
positive and concave relation between incentive compensation and cost of public debt. I contribute to this 
literature by finding evidence of a positive relation between bond yields and incentive compensation, and 
no relation between loan spreads and incentive compensation. My findings support Ortiz-Molina (2005) 
result on the relation between incentive compensation and bond yields. To my knowledge, the relation 
between incentive compensation and overall cost of loans has not been investigated before. 
My model raises a novel prediction regarding the link between managerial incentive 
compensation and the inclusion of a collateral provision in the debt contract. There are theoretical and 
empirical papers (see, e.g., Berger and Udell, 1990; Berger and Udell, 1995; Carey, Post, and Sharpe, 
1998; John, Lynch, and Puri, 2003; Booth and Booth, 2006) that suggest that collateral is a risk-reducing 
feature that can be included in a debt contract to reduce borrowing costs.  My model contributes to this 
strand of the literature by showing that lenders include a collateral provision in the debt contract to reduce 
the risk-shifting incentives induced by the manager’s compensation. In the empirical tests I find support 
for the model prediction of a positive relation between collateral and managerial incentive compensation. 
To my knowledge, this relation has not been investigated before.  
 
3. The Model 
3.1   Model Setup 
Two projects are available to the firm, R and S. R yields a terminal cash flow Z with 
probability 5.0≥p , and 0 otherwise. S yields a terminal cash flow of H with probability 5.0≥q , and 0 
otherwise. HZ > , but qHpZ < . Both projects require an initial investment of I and have a positive net 
present value: 0)( >−= IpZRE  and 0)( >−= IqHSE . These parametric assumptions imply that 
project R has the highest variance. I also assume that the discount rate is 0. 
As in Almazan and Suarez (2003), the manager is in charge of the investment and financing 
decisions, has no wealth, is protected by limited liability, and has a 0 reservation level of utility. His 
compensation consists in a semi-fixed salary that depends on the outcome of the project, and in an 
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incentive component given by a fraction 10 << α  of the firm value. Following John and John (1993), 
the semi-fixed salary is W if the project succeeds and ξ−W , with 0>− ξW , if the project fails. ξ  can 
be interpreted as a salary reduction imposed on the manager when the firm is in financial distress. The 
firm is assumed to have only equity in the balance sheet and an initial value of E, with IEW << , so 
that the manager can receive the fixed salary even if the project fails. The firm can raise I by either 
issuing public bonds or receiving a bank loan. All lenders are assumed to be competitive. I assume that 
banks monitor the manager’s project choice at a fixed cost c. Public lenders, on the other hand, cannot 
observe the manager’s project choice. I describe the monitoring technology in section 3.3.1.  Bondholders 
and banks can also require collateral from the firm. If a collateral provision is included in the contract and 
the firm defaults, all collateralized assets are transferred to the lender. Employers generally have priority 
over creditors in case of bankruptcy; however, if outside creditors have collateralized claims, they have 
priority over everybody else. Thus, if debt is collateralized, even the fixed component of the manager’s 
compensation is at risk.  
The parameters of the model (Z, H, E, I, q, p, W, ξ, and α) and the players’ utility functions are 
common knowledge. However, lenders cannot observe the manager’s project choice. The final outcome is 
assumed to be observable but not verifiable: lenders can observe a success or a failure, but cannot infer 
the manager’s project choice. Thus, a contract between the lenders and the firm cannot be written on the 
final outcome of either project.  
 
3.2   Public debt 
Assume for now that the firm can only raise money by issuing straight bonds, and that investors 
cannot monitor the project choice. The timing of the game is as follows: in t=0 lenders decide what 
interest rate to charge the firm, and if a collateral provision should be included in the contract. The 
manager observes the terms of the loan. The contract is signed. In t=1 the manager invests in one of the 
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projects. His decision is not observable by bondholders. Finally, in t=2, all payoffs are realized. Figure 1 
describes the timing of the game. 
 
Figure 1: timing of the game 
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3.2.1   Public debt - The manager’s investment choice 
I now use backwards induction to find the equilibrium interest rate and project choice. I start with 
the manager’s decision in t=1. The manager knows the interest rate offered by the lenders in t=0, and with 
that information chooses the project that maximizes his expected profit ( ) rPE jiMj , such that 
( ) 0, ≥jiMj rPE , where iP , with { }RSi ,= , indicates the project choice, and jr , with { }CNCj ,= , 
indicates the interest rate offered by lenders and the inclusion of a collateral provision. NC indicates non-
collateralized debt, while C indicates collateralized debt. Given this payoff structure, the manager’s 
choice depends on the interest rate offered by bondholders. The manager’s reaction function is described 
in Lemma 1 (all proofs are in the Appendix): 
 
Lemma 1 
(i) If public lenders do not require collateral, the manager’s reaction function is 
( )
( )            II
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Lenders choose 
interest rate and 
collateral. The 
contract is 
signed. 
The manager 
invests in one of 
the projects. 
Payoffs are 
realized. 
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(ii) If public lenders do require collateral, the manager’s reaction function is 
( )
( ) 1)(
*
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*
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−
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−
−
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>
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                  rr  if R
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To focus on non trivial results, I assume that ( ) 01* ≅=αCr :  this is equivalent to assuming that with 
perfect alignment the manager always prefers the risky project. Lemma 1 states that if the interest rate 
charged by bondholders is above the threshold *NCr  ( *Cr ), the manager invests in the risky project R; 
otherwise he invests in the safe project S. Thus, the manager sometimes invests in the project with lower 
net present value and higher volatility.  
The reason lies in the manager’s compensation structure. The manager’s compensation is partly 
fixed. If he invests in the risky project R, his profit is W with probability p and W- ξ with probability (1-
p). On the other hand, if he invests in the safe project S, his profit is W with probability q and W- ξ with 
probability (1-q). If the fixed component is the only component of the compensation, the manager will 
always choose the safe project S, because for that project the probability of the highest outcome W is 
higher. The same logic applies to collateralized debt.1 The manager’s compensation also consists of an 
incentive component given by a fraction α of the firm value. For that component alone, the preference 
toward one of the projects depends on the firm borrowing costs. Intuitively, if the rate is above the 
threshold, the manager’s payoffs in case of project success and failure are not very different: if the project 
succeeds most of the output goes to the lenders through the interest rate, while if the project fails the 
manager is left with nothing because the firm defaults. Therefore, the manager’s optimal choice is to 
invest in the project with the highest payoff in case of success. On the other hand, if the interest rate is 
below the threshold, the manager prefers the project with the highest probability of success.2 3 
                                                 
1
 The situation of a manager that receives only a fixed salary can be captured by the model by setting the parameter 
α to 0. Notice that, if α=0, the thresholds tend to infinity: therefore, the condition to choose S is always satisfied.  
2
 Notice that, when collateral is included, the threshold rate is greater: when the fixed compensation is at risk 
because of the collateral provision, the manager has more incentive to invest in the project with the highest 
probability of success (the safe project S).   
 13 
The manager’s final choice depends on the combination of the two components of the 
compensation. Comparative statics shows that if the manager’s incentives become more aligned with the 
shareholders’ through a higher level of incentive compensation α, the threshold interest rate *NCr ( *Cr ) 
becomes smaller, and the condition to invest in the safe project S more difficult to satisfy. In other words, 
aligned managers have more incentives to invest in the risky project. The reason is that, as α increases, the 
incentive compensation becomes more important with respect to the fixed component, ceteris paribus. 4 
 
3.2.2   Public debt - Bondholders’ interest rate choice 
Since bondholders can also solve the manager’s optimization problem, they anticipate the 
manager’s reaction to each interest rate they offer. Competitive bondholders charge an interest rate that, 
given the manager’s reaction function, guarantees them a non-negative expected profit. Thus, 
bondholders charge the interest rate jr  that solves ( )( ) 0, =jMjL rfrE , where jr , with { }CNCj ,= , 
indicates the interest rate offered by bondholders and the inclusion of a collateral provision. Lenders’ 
expected utility function changes depending on the manager’s anticipated project choice. Lenders know 
that if they offer *NCNC rr <  ( *CC rr < ), the manager invests in the safe project S. Thus, they charge the 
interest rate NCr  that solves 0))(1()1(),( =−−+−++= IWEqrqIrSE NCNCL ξ  (with collateral they 
charge the interest rate Cr  that solves 0)1()1(),( =−−++= IEqrqIrSE CCL ).  
On the other hand, lenders know that the manager’s optimal response to  *NCNC rr >  ( *CC rr > ) is 
to invest in the risky project R. Thus, in that case, they charge the interest rate NCr  that solves 
                                                                                                                                                             
3
 It can be shown that the shareholders’ threshold interest rates are lower than the manager’s thresholds: they prefer 
the safe project less often. The reason is that shareholders do not receive any fixed compensation. 
4
 Comparative statics also shows that when the initial investment I increases, the manager has more incentive to 
invest in the risky project and try to recover the higher project cost. Also, if the probability of success of the safe 
project q increases, the safe project becomes more attractive; on the other hand, if the probability of success of the 
risky project p increases, the manager has more incentive to invest in the risky project. Similarly, if the successful 
outcome of the safe (risky) project H (Z) increases, the safe (risky) project becomes more attractive. 
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0))(1()1(),( =−−+−++= IWEprpIrRE NCNCL ξ  (if a collateral provision is included, they 
charge the interest rate Cr  that solves 0)1()1(),( =−−++= IEprpIrRE CCL  ). 
 
3.1.3   Public debt  - The equilibrium project choice and interest rate 
In what follows I describe the backwards-induction outcomes ),( iji rP , where iP , with { }RSi ,= , 
indicates the manager’s project choice, and jr , with { }CNCj ,= , indicates the interest rate offered by 
bondholders and the inclusion of a collateral provision. This is done via a proposition. (All proofs are in 
the Appendix). To simplify the problem, I assume that the model parameters satisfy the restriction 
( ) ( )qpW −−< 1/1/ξ . 
 
Proposition 1.  
(i)  If *NCαα <  the backwards-induction outcome is ),( SNCrS and the manager’s profit is 
[ ]  0IWqEqHqWrSE SNCMNC >−−−+++−−= ξαξ )1()1(),( . *NCα  and SNCr  are     
( )
( )[ ] ( )[ ]IWqEqHqIWqEqZp
pqq
NC
−−−++−−−−++
−
= ξξ
ξ
α
11
*
 
  
qI
WEqI
r SNC 1
))(1(
−
−+−−
=
ξ
 
(ii) If ** CNC ααα <<  the backwards-induction outcome is ),( SCrS  and the manager’s profit is 
[ ] 0 IqWEqHqWrSE SCMC >−−++= α),( . *Cα  and SCr  are  
( )
[ ] [ ]IqWEqHqIqWEqZp
Wpqq
C
−−+−−−+
−
=
*α  
 
qI
EqI
r SC 1
)1(
−
−−
=  
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(iii)   Finally, if *Cαα >  the backwards-induction outcome is ),( RNCrR  and the manager’s profit 
is [ ]  0IWpEpZpWrRE RNCMNC >−−−+++−−= ξαξ )1()1(),( . RNCr  is   
1))(1( −−+−−=
pI
WEpI
r RNC
ξ
 
 
Proposition 1 shows that, for small alphas, the manager invests in the safe project S, even without a 
collateral provision. When *NCαα <  only a small fraction of the manager’s compensation is linked to 
firm value: thus, the manager maximizes the probability of receiving the fixed salary W by investing in 
the project with the highest probability of success. When ** CNC ααα << , and a more consistent fraction 
of the manager’s compensation is tied to firm value, bondholders must impose a collateral provision in 
the contract to provide the manager with the incentive to invest in the safe project. The collateral 
provision affects the manager’s incentives by putting his fixed compensation at risk. Once again, the 
manager maximizes his utility by investing in the project with the highest probability of success, S. 
Finally, for *Cαα > , the manager’s compensation depends relatively more on the incentive component: 
thus, the manager has the incentive to invest in the project with the highest outcome, even tough the 
expected outcome is small. In this case, not even a collateral provision affects the manager’s incentives 
for asset substitution: collateral affects only the fixed component of the compensation, and for high α the 
fixed component is relatively not important. 
Simple manipulations of the equations for the threshold s'*α  show that the numerator is the 
difference in the expected fixed compensation obtained by choosing S over R, while the denominator is 
the difference in the expected incentive compensation obtained by choosing R over S (for a specific 
interest rate). Consider the case of SCr  as an example. ( )[ ]IqWEqZqppWrRE SCMC −−++= /),( α  
is the manager’s expected profit when the interest rate is SCr  and he invests in project R. On the other 
hand, [ ]IqWEqHqWrSE SCMC −−++= α),( is the manager’s profit when the interest rate is SCr and 
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he invests in project S. The difference in expected fixed compensation obtained by choosing S over R is 
Wpq )( − , while the difference in expected incentive compensation obtained by choosing R over S is 
( )[ ] [ ]IqWEqHIqWEqZqp −−+−−−+/ . The two expressions represent the numerator and the 
denominator of *Cα  respectively.  If 
*
Cα  is high, the expected advantage of choosing S over R on the fixed 
part of the compensation is relatively higher than then expected advantage of choosing R over S on the 
incentive component of the compensation. Therefore, it is optimal to invest in the safe project S. 
To summarize, Proposition 1 states that as the manager’s incentive compensation α  increases, 
bondholders first include a collateral provision in the contract, then increase the interest rate. 
 
3.3   Bank debt 
3.3.1   Timing and Monitoring technology 
Assume now that firms can only raise I from banks. Banks are assumed to be able to monitor the 
manager’s project choice.5 The timing of the game is as follows: in t=0 the bank decides what interest rate 
to charge the firm, and if a collateral provision should be included in the contract. The contract is signed. 
In t=1 the manager invests in one of the projects. The bank receives a signal that can be either S for the 
safe project or R for the risky project. Assume that if the signal is R, the bank stops the project, recovers I, 
and punishes the firm by liquidating ( )ξ−− WE  (E if the loan is collateralized); if the signal is S 
nothing changes. Finally, in t=2, all payoffs are realized. Figure 2 describes the timing of the game.  
The bank pays a fixed cost c for the signal. Assume that ( ) 1| === SprojSsigP  and 
( ) φ=== RprojSsigP | .  If the manager invests in the safe project, the signal has a precision of 1 and 
is always S. If, on the other hand, the manager invests in the risky project, the signal is wrong with 
probability φ . The monitoring technology is common knowledge. Figure 2 describes the timing of the 
game. 
                                                 
5
 Altman, Gande, and Saunders (2006) argue that banks’ incentives to monitor are likely to be preserved even in the 
presence of loan syndication and a secondary loan market. 
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Figure 2: timing of the game 
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3.3.2 Bank debt - The manager’s project choice 
As before, this game can be solved by backwards induction. In the second stage (t=1) the 
manager invests in either S or R depending on the interest rate offered by the bank and the precision of the 
signal. Thus, the manager maximizes his expected profit ( )( )ijiMj PrPE φ,,  with respect to project iP , 
(with { }RSi ,= ) so that  ( )( ) 0,, ≥ijiMj PrPE φ , where jr , with { }CNCj ,= , indicates the interest rate 
offered by the bank and the inclusion of a collateral provision. Given this payoff structure, the manager’s 
choice depends on the interest rate offered by the bank, the precision of the signal, and the punishment the 
firm has to suffer if he is caught investing in the risky project. The manager’s reaction function is 
described in Lemma 2 (all proofs are in the Appendix): 
 
Lemma 2 
(i) If the bank does not require collateral, the manager’s reaction function is 
( )
( )         II
WE
Ipq
pZqH
r   where
rr  if S
                  rr  if R
rg NC
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NCM 1)( **
*
−+
−
+
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−
=
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

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<
>
=
α
ξ
φ
φ
 
(ii) If the bank does require collateral, the manager’s reaction function is 
The bank 
chooses interest 
rate and 
collateral. The 
contract is 
signed. 
The manager invests in one of 
the projects. The bank 
receives the signal. If the 
signal is S nothing changes; if 
the signal is R the bank 
recovers I and punishes the 
firm. 
Payoffs are 
realized. 
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Lemma 2 states that if the interest rate charged by the bank is above the threshold *NCr  ( *Cr ), the manager 
invests in the risky project R; otherwise he invests in the safe project S. A comparison with the threshold 
interest rates of the public debt case (Lemma1) shows that, for 1<φ , ** NCNC rr >  and ** CC rr > : with bank 
debt the condition to invest in the safe project is easier to satisfy. The intuition is that if the signal is to 
some extent informative (the probability φ  of receiving the wrong signal is less than 1), the manager 
investing in the risky project R could be detected and lose the incentive component of the compensation 
as well as part of his fixed salary (all of it if the loan is collateralized). Thus, monitoring can reduce the 
manager’s incentives to invest in the risky project. Notice that as the precision of the signal increases (φ  
diminishes) *NCr  and *Cr  increase, because the probability of being detected increases, and reduces the 
manager’s incentives to invest in the risky project.6 7  
 
3.3.3 Bank debt - The bank’s interest rate 
Since the bank can solve the manager’s optimization problem as well as the manager, it can 
anticipate the manager’s reaction to each interest rate, and the related signal precision. The competitive 
bank charges an interest rate that, given the manager’s reaction function, guarantees a non-negative 
expected profit. Thus, the bank charges the interest rate jr  that solves ( ) ( )( )( ) 0,, =jMjMjL rgrgrE φ , 
                                                 
6
 If 1=φ , then ** NCNC rr =  and ** CC rr = : the signal is always wrong, thus there is no monitoring.  
7
 As in the case of public debt, if managerial incentives are more aligned with the shareholders’ (α increases), the 
condition that makes the safe project the best choice is stronger (the threshold rates become smaller); when the 
initial investment I increases, the manager has more incentive to invest in the risky project to try to recover the 
higher project cost; if the probability of success of the safe (risky) project increases, the safe (risky)  project 
becomes more attractive; if the successful outcome of the safe (risky) project H (Z) increases, the manager has more 
incentives to invest in the safe (risky) project. 
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where jr , with { }CNCj ,= , indicates the interest rate offered by lenders and the inclusion of a collateral 
provision.  
 
3.3.4 Bank debt - The equilibrium project choice and interest rate 
To focus on non-trivial results, I assume that the model parameters satisfy the restriction 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]IWqEqHIWqEqZpq −−−++−−−++< ξξφ 1/1/ .  This assumption guarantees that the 
outcome ),( SNCrS is not always feasible. In other words, I assume that there for some α  the manager, 
offered the interest rate SNCr , invests in the risky project R. In what follows I describe the backwards-
induction outcomes ),( iji rP , where iP , with { }RSi ,= , indicates the manager’s project choice, and jr , 
with { }CNCj ,= , indicates the interest rate offered by the bank and the inclusion of a collateral 
provision. This is done via a proposition. (All proofs are in the Appendix). 
 
Proposition 2.  
(i) If *NCαα <  the backwards-induction outcome is ),( SNCrS and the manager’s profit is 
[ ]  0cIWqEqHqWrSE SNCMNC >−−−−+++−−= ξαξ )1()1(),( . *NCα  and SNCr  are  
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(ii) If ** CNC ααα <<  the backwards-induction outcome is ),( SCrS  and the manager’s profit is 
[ ] 0 cIqWEqHqWrSE SCMC >−−−++= α),( . *Cα  and SCr  are  
( )
[ ] [ ]cIqWEqHqcIqWEqZp
Wpqq
C
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−
= φ
φ
α *  
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(iii)   Finally, if *Cαα >  the backwards-induction outcome is ),( RNCrR  and the manager’s profit is 
[ ]  0cIWpEpZpWrRE RNCMNC >−−−−+++−−= φξφφαξφ )1()1(),( if and only if 
( ) ( )cIqWEqHcIqWEqZpq −−−+−−−+< //φ ; otherwise, if *NCαα >  and pq φ/  is above 
the threshold, the backwards-induction outcome is ),( SCrS and the manager’s payoff is 
[ ] 0 cIqWEqHqWrSE SCMC >−−−++= α),( .  RNCr  is given by  
1))(1( −−+−−+=
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Proposition 2 is qualitatively similar to Proposition 1. It states that if alpha is low ( *NCαα < ) the manager 
maximizes the probability of receiving the fixed compensation by choosing the project with the highest 
probability of success (project S). For higher alphas ( ** CNC ααα << ), the bank has to put the fixed 
compensation at risk by including a collateral provision to force the manager to invest in the safe project. 
Finally, for *Cαα > , two outcomes are possible: if the precision of the signal ( )φ−1 is low enough that 
pq φ/ is below the threshold, it is not possible to induce the manager to invest in the safe project: thus the 
bank does not require collateral, but charges the firm a higher interest rate, and the backwards-induction 
outcome is ),( RNCrR . On the other hand, if the precision of the signal is high enough that pq φ/  is above 
the threshold, the manager invests in the safe project S if a collateral provision is included in the contract, 
and the backwards-induction outcome is still ),( SCrS . 
It turns out that ** NCNC αα >  and 
**
CC αα >  if the monitoring cost c is small and 1<φ . The 
intuition is that monitoring, and the related risk of being caught investing in the risky project, affects the 
manager’s incentives for asset substitution: the manager chooses to invest in the safe project more often if 
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monitored by the bank, because he wants to avoid the punishment the firm would incur if the choice of 
the risky project was detected. 8 
 
3.4   The choice between public and bank debt 
In what follows I describe the backwards-induction outcomes of the game when the manager can 
choose the financing source. This is done via a proposition. (All proofs are in the Appendix). 
 
Proposition 3.  
(i) If *NCαα <  the backwards-induction outcome is ),( SNCrS and the manager’s expected payoff is 
[ ]  0IWqEqHqWrSE SNCMNC >−−−+++−−= ξαξ )1()1(),( .  
(ii) If ** NCNC ααα <<  the backwards-induction outcome is ),( SNCrS  and the manager’s expected payoff 
is [ ]  0cIWqEqHqWrSE SNCMNC >−−−−+++−−= ξαξ )1()1(),( . 
(iii) If ** CNC ααα <<  the backwards-induction outcome is ),( SCrS and the manager’s expected payoff is  
[ ] 0 cIqWEqHqWrSE SCMC >−−−++= α),( . 
(iv) If *Cαα >  and ( ) ( )cIqWEqHcIqWEqZpq −−−+−−−+< //φ , the backwards-induction 
outcome is ),( RNCrR  and [ ]  0IWpEpZpWrRE RNCMNC >−−−+++−−= ξαξ )1()1(),(  is  the 
manager’s payoff. Otherwise, if *NCαα >  and pq φ/  is greater than the threshold, the backwards 
induction outcome is ),( SCrS and the manager’s expected payoff is 
[ ] 0 cIqWEqHqWrSE SCMC >−−−++= α),( . 
 
                                                 
8
 Notice that the threat of punishment must be credible to affect the manager’s incentives. The threat is credible only 
if a bank that receives the signal R has the incentive to punish the firm instead of just hoping for a successful 
outcome of the risky project. It is straightforward to show that the punishment maximizes the bank expected payoff 
when the signal is R. 
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Proposition 3 illustrates the main result of the model. For low levels of alpha the manager invests in the 
safe project S without monitoring or the inclusion of a collateral provision in the contract. This result is 
driven by the relative importance the manager places on the fixed component of his compensation: for 
low α  the manager maximizes the probability of receiving the fixed compensation in full by choosing 
the project with the highest probability of success (S). Because the manager does not need to be 
monitored to avoid risk-shifting activities, there is no need to pay the monitoring cost c associated with 
bank debt: the manager chooses to issue public bonds. For ** NCNC ααα <<  two outcomes are feasible: 
),( SCrS  and ),( SNCrS . Without bank monitoring the manager invests in the safe project only if a 
collateral provision is included in the contract, while with bank monitoring the collateral provision is not 
necessary, because the expected cost of being caught investing in project R is too high. It can be shown 
that the manager’s expected payoff is higher with bank monitoring: the backwards-induction outcome is 
),( SNCrS .9 If ** CNC ααα <<  the two feasible outcomes are ),( RNCrR  and ),( SCrS . Without bank 
monitoring not even a collateral provision can induce the manager to invest in the safe project. On the 
other hand, with bank monitoring and a collateral provision the risk of being caught investing in the risky 
project and the risk of losing the fixed compensation in case of default induce the manager to invest in the 
efficient project S. It can be shown that, for these levels of α , the manager’s expected payoff is higher 
with bank monitoring. Thus, the backwards-induction outcome is ),( SCrS .  
Finally, I investigate the case *Cαα > . Suppose first that the probability φ  that the signal is 
wrong is high enough that pq φ/  is below the threshold. If that is the case, not even bank monitoring can 
change the manager’s incentives to invest in the risky project, because the probability that the manager is 
caught violating the covenant that prohibits the firm to invest in the risky project is too low. Thus, two 
outcomes are feasible: ),( RNCrR  and ),( RNCrR . If monitoring cannot affect the manager’s asset 
                                                 
9
 Notice that SNC
S
C rr < : the interest rate charged to the firm is lower with public debt; however, the manager prefers 
to submit to bank monitoring and avoid the collateral provision in order to protect his fixed compensation. 
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substitution incentives, there is no need to pay the monitoring cost c: thus, the backwards-induction 
outcome is ),( RNCrR and the manager chooses public debt. On the other hand, if the probability φ    that 
the signal is wrong is low enough that pq φ/  is greater than the threshold, bank monitoring can affect the 
manager’s incentives: because the probability of being caught and punished is now high enough, the 
manager has the incentive to invest in the safe project and avoid the potential punishment. The two 
feasible outcomes are ),( RNCrR  and ),( SCrS : it can be shown that the manager’s expected payoff is 
higher with bank monitoring, so that ),( SCrS  is the backwards-induction outcome. 
To summarize, Proposition 3 shows that the relation between α (the interest alignment between 
manager and shareholders) and the manager preference toward bank debt is positive. Managers whose 
compensation depends mainly on the fixed component prefer to invest in the project with the highest 
expected payoff, and need no monitoring; on the other hand, managers with relatively high incentive 
compensation have the incentive to invest in the project with the highest outcome, but submit to bank 
monitoring to reduce borrowing costs. Banks can force the manager to invest in the efficient project by 
monitoring his project choice and punishing the firm if risk-shifting is detected. If the bank is not able to 
monitor the manager’s choices closely (φ  is high), the relation between α and the preference towards 
bank debt is concave: when monitoring and the inclusion of a collateral provision are not enough to deter 
the manager from risk-shifting activities, bank debt loses its advantage over public debt. Thus, the 
manager prefers to save the monitoring cost c by choosing public debt.  
According to Proposition 3, if ** CNC ααα <<  the manager has the opportunity to invest in the 
efficient project only if bank loans are available. In terms of social welfare, the total NPV for manager, 
shareholders and lenders improves by cpZqH −− because the manager is now forced to invest in 
project with higher NPV and lower volatility. The cost to society is only the monitoring cost c; however, 
if banks are competitive, c is very low. 
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Proposition 3 provides an alternative explanation of the relation between incentive compensation 
and the preference towards bank debt. In Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1993) and Almazan and 
Suarez (2003) the relation between incentive compensation and financing decisions is driven by the 
manager’s incentives to extract private benefits at the expense of the shareholders; the role of bank 
monitoring and incentive compensation is to protect shareholders’ interest by forcing the manager to 
avoid pet projects, and to invest efficiently. In my model, on the other hand, incentive compensation 
provides the manager with the incentive to engage in asset substitution activities at the expense of the 
lenders, and bank monitoring is a commitment mechanism to limit the manager incentives for risk-
shifting activities and reduce the firm borrowing costs. This intuition has testable implications on the 
links between incentive compensation, borrowing costs, and collateralization decision that distinguish it 
from Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1993) and Almazan and Suarez (2003) models.  
I make some simplifying assumptions to develop the model: I consider only a non-repeated game 
with no renegotiation, I model incentive compensation as exogenous, and I analyze firms with no existing 
debt. In my model the game ends at period 2 when the payoffs are realized. It is possible, though, to 
develop a scenario in which the game is repeated multiple times and firms that invested in the inefficient 
project in the first stage are refused additional financing. In this scenario, there would be no asset 
substitution, because the cost of losing all future financing opportunity would be too high. The problem 
with such a model is that the coordination between banks would be difficult to achieve. Additionally, 
empirical evidence suggests that managers do engage in asset substitution activities (Parrino and 
Weisbach, 1999), even more when their compensation is tied to firm performance (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, 
and Raman, 2001; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001). Renegotiation does not change the result of my model. 
Depending on the parameters, lenders may provide new financing hoping to recover the money already 
spent on the firm. However, this new loan/bond must have a higher interest rate, thus exacerbating the 
manager’s incentive to engage in asset substitution activities. Thus, although renegotiation might be 
possible, it does not affect the relation between incentive compensation and spreads.  
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In my model firm owners want the manager to protect their interests and maximize shareholders’ 
value. They achieve this objective by granting the manager incentive compensation. There is no need for 
them to make the compensation scheme contingent on the manager’s financing choices. From an 
empirical standpoint, it is unusual to observe managerial contracts with rewards that depend directly on 
the CEO’s financing choices. Additionally, I find that my empirical results are robust to endogeneity 
concerns on the incentive variables.  
Existing firm debt does not change the results of the model.  Additional claims on the firm profit 
give the manager even more incentives to invest in the project with the highest outcome (the risky project 
R). Myers and Majluf (1984), however, show that if the firm uses up the ability to issue low risk debt, it 
eventually incurs in the underinvestment problem. In this paper I do not study the agency problem of 
underinvestment: my model is focused on managers that have already decided to invest and must choose 
between public and bank financing. In this framework, the assumption of no initial leverage is not 
restrictive.  
 
3.5   Testable hypotheses 
My model has empirical implications on the cross-sectional relation between managerial 
incentive compensation and the probability that a bank loan is preferred to public bonds as the firm 
financing source. The model predicts that when the manager’s compensation is tied to firm performance, 
the manager prefers bank to public debt. The model also predicts that, if the costly signal received by the 
bank is not very precise, the bank cannot limit the risk-shifting incentives of a manager with high 
incentive compensation. The manager, in that case, prefers public debt. In empirical terms, the model 
predicts a positive and concave relation between the manager’s incentive compensation, and the 
preference toward bank debt.  In my model the incentive alignment between manager and shareholders is 
captured by the fraction of the firm value granted to the manager as incentive compensation (α). Thus, α 
represents the manager’s stock holdings. In real contracts, however, incentive compensation does not 
consist of stock holdings only: managers are usually awarded stock options with different vesting periods, 
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maturities, and strike prices. The logic of the argument does not change: incentive alignment, however 
achieved, increases the manager’s incentives to asset substitution. From an empirical standpoint, incentive 
alignment between manager and shareholders can be captured by Core and Guay (2002) Pay-
Performance-Sensitivity to account for stock options as well as stock holdings. As alternative measure I 
use DELTA, the sensitivity of option value to changes in the underlying stock price.  
The choice of incentive compensation variables needs some additional discussion. What drives 
investment and financing choices in my model is the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
lenders. If the firm is in some level of financial distress, shareholders have the incentive to forgo safe, 
profitable project if most of the profit must be paid back to lenders. On the other hand, they do have the 
incentive to invest in projects that, although with a lower expected value, have a higher outcome in case 
of project success. Managers are usually the decision-takers in the firm, and their risk preferences and 
incentives may be different. Tying compensation to stock performance aligns managers’ and 
shareholders’ preferences:  thus, managers that hold firm stocks and options share owners’ incentive to 
invest in the risky project and expropriate lenders. In my model, the incentive alignment between 
manager and shareholders is the trigger of the asset substitution activities. In the empirical tests I measure 
incentive alignment with Pay-Performance-Sensitivity and Delta. 
Vega, the sensitivity of option value to changes in the volatility, is a direct measure of the effect 
of stock options on manager’s preferences toward risk. Stock option value increases with the volatility of 
the underlying asset: thus, stock options give managers incentives to increase the volatility of the firm 
equity. This is not, however, the incentive I try to measure: my focus is on the manager’s incentive to 
forgo safe projects for less efficient ones to expropriate bondholders. The incentive for such asset 
substitution activities depends on the interest alignment between manager and shareholders, which is best 
measured by Pay-Performance-Sensitivity and Delta. Those will be the main incentive compensation 
variables in the regressions. 
My model predicts that bondholders anticipate asset substitution activities and price the 
manager’s incentive compensation. The model also predicts that banks reduce the manager’s asset 
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substitution incentives ex-ante, and do not need to increase the borrowing costs.  Empirically, the model 
predicts a positive relation between manager’s incentive Pay-Performance-Sensitivity and bond spreads, 
and no relation between Pay-Performance-Sensitivity and loan spreads.  
My model also has a novel empirical implication on the cross-sectional relation between 
manager’s incentive compensation and the inclusion of a collateral provision in the loan contract. The 
model predicts that banks collateralize the loan more often if the manager’s compensation is tied to firm’s 
performance. The intuition is that a collateral provision can, as a risk-reducing feature of the loan, limit 
the manager’s incentives to asset substitution. Empirically, the model predicts that the probability of 
including a collateral provision in the debt contract is positively related to the CEO’s Pay-Performance-
Sensitivity. 
 
4. Data and variable definition 
4.1   Data 
To test my hypotheses I use data on bank loans, bond issues, firm characteristics, and executive 
compensation. I obtain the sample of private corporate debt from Dealscan, a database created by Loan 
Pricing Corporation (LPC). I extract loan information for the period 1992-2005. The sample consists of 
loans made by US banks to US companies. I exclude utilities and financial firms from the sample of 
borrowers, and I only keep in the sample loans that are not refinancing agreements.  Dealscan provides 
information on loans at facility level: a deal is a package of multiple facilities or tranches, each usually 
different in terms of pricing, maturity, and amount. For the main tests I aggregate the information from 
facilities that belong to the same loan in a single observation. Specifically, I compute dollar amount, 
spread, and maturity of the loan as weighted averages of dollar amounts, spreads, and maturities of the 
loan tranches. I compute the weights as the ratio of tranche amount to deal amount. I refer to the Dealscan 
sample as the private sample. 
I obtain data on straight bond issues from Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD), a 
database created by Mergent. I extract bond information for the period 1992-2005. The sample consists of 
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straight corporate bonds issued by US firms in US markets. I eliminate utilities and financial firms from 
the sample of issuers. I refer to this sample as the public sample. I obtain information on executive 
compensation from ExecuComp for the period 1992-2005. Finally, I obtain data on firm characteristics 
from Compustat North America over the same time period. I am interested in the information that is 
available to the lenders at the time of the loan: thus, I extract information from ExecuComp and 
Compustat from the last available financial statement at the time of the loan/bond issue.  
 
4.2   Variable Description 
4.2.1   Managerial Incentive Alignment 
I use Pay-Performance-Sensitivity to measure the incentive alignment between manager and 
shareholders. Following Core and Guay (2002), I define Pay-Performance-Sensitivity (PPS) as the 
sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio to firm value, and compute it as the dollar increase in the manager’s 
portfolio for $1,000 increase in firm value. My alternative measure for incentive alignment is DELTA, 
measured as the dollar increase in the value of the manager’s stock options for a $1 increase in stock 
price. 
 
4.2.2   Choice between Public and Private Debt 
I use the ratio new bank debt to total new debt in a year to measure the manager’s preference 
toward bank debt. I call this variable %NEW BANK. 
 
4.2.3   Cost of Debt 
I use Dealscan’s overall cost variable as a measure of the cost of bank loans, and label this 
variable SPREAD. Dealscan provides the overall cost of the loan, including annual and upfront fees, as a 
spread over the London interbank offering rate (LIBOR). If the base rate is not the LIBOR, Dealscan 
converts the spread over the base rate to spread over LIBOR by adding or subtracting a constant 
differential that reflects historical differences between the relevant rates. For the public sample, I define 
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SPREAD as the spread over a Treasury bond of comparable maturity. The variable SPREAD is not 
directly comparable across the two groups because bank loan rates are floating, while public bond rates 
are fixed. I use Cook and Spellman (2006) method to create the fixed equivalent of a floating rate. I call 
this variable RATE PAID. For bank loans, I compute RATE PAID by adding the then one-month LIBOR 
and the then prevailing rate for the Treasury bond with the same maturity to SPREAD, and subtracting the 
then three-month Treasury rate. For public bonds, I define RATE PAID as the offering yield in basis 
points. I delete from the sample all observations for which the variables SPREAD is missing. 
 
4.2.4 Collateral 
I define a dummy variable COLLATERAL that takes a value of 1 if the bond /loan is 
collateralized, 0 otherwise. There are 380 missing values for the variable COLLATERAL in the private 
sample and 91 in the public sample. I exclude the missing observations only where the variable 
COLLATERAL is included in the tests. 
 
4.2.5 Control Variables 
I use dummy variables for the second and third terciles of firm total assets (SIZE2 and SIZE3) to 
capture size effects and non linearities in the relation between size and the dependent variables of my 
study. I include the ratio of operating income before depreciation and total assets (PROFITABILITY) and 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reported a loss (LOSS) to measure firm profitability. I use two 
measures of growth opportunities: the ratio of R&D expense and total assets (R&D), and the book value 
of debt plus market value of common and preferred stock divided by total assets (and MARKET-TO-
BOOK). I include the age of the firm (AGE) to capture reputation effects. 
My proxies for potential financial distress are the ratio of liabilities to total debt (BOOK 
LEVERAGE), the ratio of operating income before depreciation to interest expense (INTEREST 
COVERAGE), and Altman (1981) Z-SCORE, computed as 
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account for overall firm risk I also include in the analysis the moving standard deviation of daily returns 
on a window of 30 days (RETURNS VOLATILITY), and the ratio of net plant and equipment to total 
assets (TANGIBILITY)10. I include in the analysis the dummy variable BLOCK to account for the 
presence of block holders. 
I include in all regressions the variable MATURITY, calculated as the maturity of the loan/bond 
in years, and DEAL AMOUNT, computed as total amount of the loan/bond issue. Finally, I include the 
variable INTEREST VOLATILITY, measured as the monthly average of the 12-month moving standard 
deviation of daily yields on 10-years U.S. T-bonds. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. 
Regressions include industry dummies based on the first 2 digits of the NAICS code, and year dummies. 
The private and public samples have 631 and 1567 observations respectively.  A list of all variables and 
their definition is provided in Table I. 
 
5. Univariate Analysis 
Table II presents a description of the private sample. Panel A shows that the vast majority 
(97.65%) of bank loans are syndicated deals. Panel B shows that the most common facility type is the 
revolver line with a maturity of more than one year (53.95%) followed by the 364-day facility (33.46%). 
Finally Panel C reports that general corporate purposes (37%), CP backup and takeover (19% each) are 
the most common facility purposes11. Panel A of Table III reports the percentage of repeated borrowers in 
the public and private sample. Approximately 20% of the firms in the private sample have multiple bank 
loans in the sample period. On the other hand, 64% of the firms in the public sample issued multiple 
bonds. Panel B of Table III reports the number of deals for each company. On average, firms in the 
private sample have 1.58 new bank loans during the sample period. Firms on the public sample, on the 
                                                 
10
 Investments in fixed capital are easily monitored by lenders, and can be used as collateral. Therefore, a firm with 
tangible assets is perceived as less risky.  
 
11
 According to SDC, the purpose of almost all bond issues in the sample period is General Corporate Purposes. 
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other hand, issued on average 3.63 new bonds. In the multivariate analysis the standard errors are adjusted 
for the clustering of observations in firms that have multiple loans or issue multiple bonds. 
 Panel A of Table IV presents the comparison of some debt contract features across the two types 
of financing, bank loans and public bonds, while panels B, C, and D report the main descriptive statistics 
for the whole, public and private sample respectively.  The main sample consists of 631 bank loans 
aggregated at deal level, and 1567 public bonds. The first row of Panel D presents the total debt issued by 
firms in the sample: the total volume of bank loans is $441,953 million, while the total volume of public 
bonds is $578,840 million. These numbers show that, in terms of volume, banks can compete with public 
bonds as a source of external financing. The mean deal amount of a bank loan is $700 million, compared 
with $369 million of a bond issue, and the difference is significant. The smallest deal in the sample is a 
bank loan of $10 million, while the biggest one is a bank loan of $7,000. New loans represent on average 
19.9% of firm assets and 43.4% of firm debt. Those percentages are significantly lower for issues of 
public bonds (6.2% and 11.1% respectively), likely because private borrowers are on average smaller than 
public borrowers. These percentages show that loans are important financing events for firms. RATE 
PAID is significantly lower in the sample of bank loans: the average RATE PAID for a bank loan is 600 
bps, against 678 bps for a bond. The average loan SPREAD is 81 bps (against 161). Loans have a shorter 
maturity with respect to bonds, 2.9 years against 13.5 on average. The shortest maturity for a bank loan is 
one year, while for a bond is two years. The longest maturities are 6.7 years for a bank loan and 100 years 
for a public bond. Finally, 38.6% of bank loans are collateralized, while the percentage for public bonds is 
only 1%: this is consistent with my model’s prediction that only banks include a collateral provision in 
the contract. 
Panel A of Table V reports the comparison of firm characteristics across private and public 
borrowers, while panels B, C, and D report the main descriptive statistics for the whole, public and 
private sample respectively. Consistent with my hypothesis that aligned managers have a preference for 
bank debt, Table V shows that private borrowers have a significantly higher PPS than public borrowers: 
an increase of $1,000 in firm value increases the value of the manager’s portfolio by $20.05. For a public 
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borrower, that number is reduced to $15.04. This result could be driven by self selection on firm size. The 
Spearman correlation coefficient between PPS and size is negative and significant (the coefficient is -
0.614 and the p-value is 0.000); additionally, Table V shows that the average size of a private borrower is 
approximately 45% of the average size of a public borrower. These two facts together may point to a 
selection problem: if small firms do not have access to bond markets, the relation between PPS and 
%NEW BANK could be positive because small firms are characterized by high PPS. In the multivariate 
regressions I will try to control for this potential selection problem and isolate the non-spurious relation 
between PPS and the choice of bank debt. DELTA, my alternative measure of incentive alignment, is also 
higher for bank borrowers, but the difference is not significant. 
Consistent with the intuition that firms that face potentially high asset substitution costs prefer to 
commit to bank monitoring, I find that private borrowers have a significantly higher MARKET-TO-
BOOK (2.018 against 1.781) and R&D (0.007 for private borrowers and 0.004 for public borrowers). As 
for overall firm risk, bank borrowers exhibit higher RETURNS VOLATILITY (2.363% against 2.103%) 
and lower TANGIBILITY (0.334 vs. 0.385) than their public counterparts. Private borrowers seem to 
have a better credit quality than public borrowers: they have lower BOOK LEVERAGE (0.161 for private 
borrowers and 0.208 for public borrowers)12, higher INTEREST COVERAGE (22.818 against 10.683), 
and higher Z-SCORE (4.191 vs. 3.151). There are no differences in profitability between the two groups. 
This finding is not consistent with Denis and Mihov (2003) result that private borrowers have a lower 
credit quality. Finally, private borrowers are younger than public borrowers (37.6 vs. 41.5 years). This 
finding is consistent with Diamond (1991) prediction that young firms choose bank debt to build 
reputation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Private borrowers also have lower book leverage (24.4% vs. 31%). 
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6. Multivariate Analysis 
6.1.1   The choice between public and private debt 
To gather insights on the relation between managerial incentive compensation and the choice 
between public and bank debt, I now turn to multivariate regression analysis. In the main tests I assume 
that managerial compensation is optimally set before the firm financing decision, and use pooled OLS as 
my primary estimation method. In Section 6.1.2 I test the assumption, and show that my results are robust 
to endogeneity concerns. I also show that my results do not depend on self selection on firm size or 
existing bank debt in the firm balance sheet.  
Table VI, Column (1), reports the results of a pooled OLS regression of the percentage of new 
bank debt (%NEW BANK) on incentive and control variables. The most important result is that the 
coefficient on PPS is positive and significant (the coefficient is 0.041 and the p-value is 0.034), while the 
coefficient on PPS^2 is negative and significant (the coefficient is -0.009 and the p-value is 0.029). This 
evidence supports my prediction that the relation between the manager’s incentive alignment and the 
preference toward bank debt is positive and concave. In terms of economic significance, the coefficients 
on PPS and PPS^2 from column (1) imply that a firm with Pay-Performance-Sensitivity in the 50th 
percentile issues almost 8.5% more new bank debt than a firm with Pay-Performance-Sensitivity in the 1st 
percentile. Even smaller increments of PPS from the 1st to the 10th percentile, or from the 5th to the 25th 
percentile, increase the percentage of new issues of bank debt by approximately 4%. The coefficients 
from Table VI indicate that the relation between PPS and %NEW BANK is concave: accordingly, for 
higher percentiles of PPS the impact of an increase in managerial incentive compensation is lower of even 
negative. For example, an increase in PPS from the 50th to the 75th percentile implies an increase in 
%NEW BANK of only 0.5%, while an increase from the 75th to the 90th percentile implies a decrease in 
%NEW BANK of 1.6%. This is consistent with my model: if incentive compensation is very high, not 
even the probability of being caught and punished can deter the manager from engaging in asset 
substitution activities. If the bank cannot change the manager’s incentives ex-ante, there is no reason for 
the firm to pay the monitoring cost: under these circumstances, the manager issues public bonds.  
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Firm size strongly affects the choice between public and bank debt: the coefficients on the two 
size terciles are both negative (-0.236 and -0.306 respectively) and highly significant. This result could be 
explained by the negative correlation between firm size and PPS: I address the issue in the next section. 
The coefficient on the third tercile is 30% larger than the coefficient on the second tercile in absolute 
terms: this shows clearly that the effect of size on the choice of debt is not linear. The coefficient on 
PROFITABILITY is negative and significant (the coefficient is -1.285 and the p-value is 0.008): 
profitable firms have a lower probability of default, thus making bank monitoring less necessary. The age 
of the firm does not seem to have an impact on debt choice: this is not consistent with Diamond’s 
prediction that new firms rely on bank debt to build a reputation (Diamond, 1991). The effect of the 
presence of a block holder is not significant.13 
The coefficient on BOOK LEVERAGE is negative and significant (the coefficient is -0.509 and 
the p-value is 0.000), while the coefficient on Z-SCORE is positive and significant (the coefficient is 
0.064 and the p-value is 0.046): these results confirm the finding from Table V that borrowers with better 
credit quality prefer bank debt. The coefficients on RETURNS VOLATILITY, MARKET-TO-BOOK 
and R&D are not significantly different from zero. The coefficient on DEAL AMOUNT is positive and 
highly significant (the coefficient is 0.091 and the p-value is 0.000): this result shows that companies in 
need of a substantial loan turn to banks.   Finally, the coefficient on MATURITY is negative and 
significant (the coefficient is -0.010 and the p-value is 0.000), indicating that firms that need a short term 
loan choose a bank loan over a bond. 
To have a better insight on the relation between incentive compensation and debt choice, I 
consider an alternative measure on incentive alignment between manager and shareholders: Column (2) 
of Table VI reports the results of a pooled OLS regression of %NEW BANK on DELTA, defined as the 
sensitivity of CEO’s stock options to changes in the stock price. The coefficient on DELTA is positive 
and significant (the coefficient is 0.762 and the p-value is 0.028). The coefficient on DELTA^2 is also 
                                                 
13
 A block holder could force the manager to invest in risky projects with the threat of termination, even when the 
manager’s interests are not aligned with the shareholders’ through incentive compensation. In unreported tests I 
check for this effect by including the interaction term PPS*BLOCK: it is not significant. 
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positive and significant (the coefficient is 0.925 and the p-value is 0.008). Thus, the preference toward 
bank debt seems to increase as delta increases. The coefficients on the control variables are comparable to 
the coefficients from the first regression.  
 
6.1.2   The choice between public and private debt: robustness checks 
Denis and Mihov (2003) suggest that the choice of the firm financing source could be affected by 
the existing debt structure. New bank debt loses its advantage on public bonds if lenders can free ride on 
pre-existing bank monitoring: if that is the case, there should be no relation between PPS (DELTA) and 
%NEW BANK. I hand collect information on existing bank debt from Moody’s Industrial Manuals for 
the period 1995-2001. I only include in the analysis debt that is explicitly labeled as bank debt. Columns 
(3) and (4) from Table VI report the coefficients of the regression of %NEW BANK on PPS and DELTA 
with the new variable %EXISTING BANK DEBT included as a control variable. The coefficient on PPS 
is still positive and significant (the coefficient is 0.064 and the p-value is 0.013), while the coefficient on 
PPS^2 is now not significantly different from 0.  The coefficient on DELTA is positive and significant 
(the coefficient is 1.428 and the p-value is 0.018), as the coefficient on DELTA^2 (the coefficient is 1.289 
and the p-value is 0.027). The results indicate that the relation between preference toward bank debt and 
managerial incentive compensation is still positive, but not concave. The coefficient on %EXISTING 
BANK DEBT is positive and significant in both regressions, indicating that public lenders do not free ride 
on pre-existing bank monitoring. 
I next consider a scenario, depicted in theoretical papers like John and John (1993) and Almazan 
and Suarez (2003), where the relation between managerial incentive compensation and firm debt choices 
is endogenous. To address the issue, I re-estimate the model with a two-stage least square regression of 
%NEW BANK, treating PPS and DELTA as endogenous variables. I use three instruments: compensation 
on the year before the relevant year, CEO tenure, and sales growth. According to Murphy (1999) 
incentive compensation depends on firm industry and size: thus, it is likely that a firm past incentive 
compensation is a determinant of incentive compensation on the relevant year. Additionally, 
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compensation from the previous year should not be related with debt choice or with the financing cost, 
because lenders are only interested in the managerial incentives in place at the time of the loan.  Palia 
(2001) and Murphy (1986) argue that the manager’s ability is unknown in the beginning of his term and 
that performance is used to infer information on managerial ability. Thus, in early years, performance has 
a larger impact on the manager’s pay-performance sensitivity. Finally Conyon and Nicolitsas (1998) and 
Kedia and Mozumdar (2002) find evidence of a positive relation between sales growth and incentive 
compensation. Following Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2003), I check the relevance of the instruments 
(correlation with the suspected endogenous variable) with partial R2 and F-test on the joint significance of 
the instruments in the first stage regression. I also check the validity of the instruments (orthogonality to 
the error process) with the Hansen J statistic. Table VII presents the results of the tests. The partial R2 
ranges from 0.305 to 0.532, while the F statistics are all above 56: the instruments seem to be relevant. 
The p-values on the Hansen J statistic fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are not 
correlated to the error process. Thus, the instruments are valid. Finally, I rest the endogeneity of PPS and 
DELTA: the Sargan C statistic fails to reject the null that PPS (DELTA) and PPS^2 (DELTA^2) are 
exogenous. Thus, my primary estimation method is pooled OLS. 
A concern in the tests presented so far is a potential sample self-selection on firm size: small 
firms, usually characterized by higher Pay-Performance-Sensitivity, may not have access to bond 
markets. That could explain the positive relation between %NEW BANK and PPS. A similar concern is 
that large firms, characterized by low PPS, may have to issue public bonds to raise sizable sums. This 
selection could also explain the positive relation between PPS and %NEW BANK. However, loan 
syndication enables banks to offer loans that are comparable in size with bond issues. In this sample the 
mean deal amount is actually greater for bank loans than public bonds. Thus, this second type of selection 
is less of a concern.  To reduce the bias from both sources, I truncate the main sample at 10% on both 
 37 
sides on firm size.14 Columns (1) and (2) from Table VIII present the results of the regression on this sub 
sample. The coefficient on PPS and PPS^2 are now not significantly different from 0. However, the 
coefficients on DELTA (the coefficient is 1.015 and the p-value is 0.016) and DELTA^2 (the coefficient 
is 1.142 and the p-value is 0.008) are still positive and highly significant.  
Myers (1977) and Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980) suggest that debt maturity can be used to 
alleviate the agency problems of underinvestment and asset substitution. In my framework, short term 
debt could be used to mitigate the asset substitution cost imposed by a manager whose interests are 
aligned with the shareholders’ through incentive compensation. Long term debt is mainly available in the 
form of public bonds: a manager who has low incentive compensation, and thus prefers long tem debt to 
avoid costly liquidation, has no choice but to issue corporate bonds. On the other hand, short term debt is 
mainly available through bank loans: a manager with high incentive compensation, who thus prefers short 
term debt to alleviate the agency problem of asset substitution, may be forced to choose bank debt.  If that 
is the case, the positive relation between incentive compensation and preference toward bank debt could 
be due to the relation between incentive compensation and maturity. To address this issue, I estimate the 
model on a sub sample truncated on maturity at 10% on both sides. Columns (3) and (4) of Table VIII 
present the regression coefficients. The coefficients on PPS and DELTA (0.039 and 0.74) are positive and 
significant. The coefficient on PPS^2 is negative and significant (the coefficient is -0.009 and the p-value 
is 0.025), while the coefficient on DELTA^2 is positive and significant (the coefficient is 0.933 and the p-
value is 0.005).15  
Finally, columns (5) and (6) of Table VIII report the coefficients of the regression from a sub 
sample truncated at 10 % on both size and maturity. The coefficients on PPS and PPS^2 are now not 
                                                 
14
 In unreported tests, I eliminate from the main sample bank borrowers that are smaller than the smallest public 
borrower, and public borrowers that are bigger than the biggest bank borrower. The results do not change 
significantly. 
. 
15
 I also estimate the model on a sub sample created by eliminating from the original sample bank loans with a 
maturity shorter than the shortest maturity of a public bond, and public bonds with a maturity longer than the longest 
maturity of a bank loan. Coefficients do not change significantly. 
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significantly different from 0, but the coefficients on DELTA and DELTA^2 are both positive and highly 
significant. These results indicate that selection on maturity and size does not fully explain the positive 
relation between incentive compensation and preference toward bank debt.  
In Table IX I include SPREAD as a determinant of the firm financing source.  Panel B of Table 
IX shows statistic and p-values of the endogeneity test, as well as the test on the relevance and validity of 
the instruments. I use a dummy variable identifying dividend payers and INTEREST VOLATILITY as 
instruments for SPREAD. Partial R2, F-statistic, and Hansen J statistic show that the instruments are 
correlated with SPREAD and orthogonal to the error process. The C-statistic confirms the endogeneity of 
SPREAD. Panel A reports the coefficients of a 2SLS regression of %NEW BANK. The coefficient on 
PPS is still positive and significant (the coefficient is 0.038 and the p-value is 0.075), while the 
coefficient on PPS^2 is still negative and significant (the coefficient is -0.010 and the p-value is 0.029). 
From column (2), the coefficient on DELTA is positive and significant (the coefficient is 0.694 and the p-
value is 0.074), while the coefficient on DELTA^2 is still positive and significant (the coefficient is 0.874 
and the p-value is 0.022). The coefficient on SPREAD is never significant. Notice that all coefficients are 
similar to the coefficients from the main regression: adding SPREAD did not change the results. In 
unreported regressions I also test the endogeneity of the maturity of the loan. Following Dennis, Nandy, 
and Sharpe (2000) I use the ratio of taxes and total assets, and asset maturity as instruments for maturity. 
The C-statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis that debt maturity is exogenous.  
To summarize, the coefficient on the main incentive alignment variable, Pay-Performance-
Sensitivity, is positive and significant even after existing debt structure is included in the model, and self 
selection induced by size and maturity is reduced.  The evidence presented in tables VI, VIII, and IX 
supports my hypothesis that a manager whose interests are aligned with the shareholders’ through 
incentive compensation shows a preference for bank debt over public bonds as the firm’s financing 
source.  
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6.2.1   Incentive alignment and spread 
I now turn to examine the relation between managerial incentive compensation and cost of public 
and bank debt. I use a multivariate regression of the spread over the relevant benchmark (SPREAD) on 
Pay-Performance-Sensitivity (PPS), DELTA, and the control variables. In the main test I assume that 
incentive compensation is exogenous and use pooled OLS. In section 6.2.2 I test the assumption and show 
that my results are robust to endogeneity concerns. 
I first focus on public borrowers. Column (1) of Table X shows the coefficients of a pooled OLS 
regression of SPREAD on PPS and the control variables on the sample of public borrowers. The main 
finding is the positive and significant coefficient on PPS (the coefficient is 6.991 and the p-value 0.025). 
The coefficient is consistent with the intuition that public lenders account for the risk-shifting incentives 
of a manager with high Pay-Performance-Sensitivity, and charge the firm a higher spread. In economic 
terms, the coefficients from column (1) in Table X imply that, holding everything else constant, 
borrowing costs of a firm with PPS in the 75th percentile are approximately 12 bps higher than borrowing 
costs of a firm with PPS in the 25th percentile. This number is consistent with Ortiz-Molina (2005) finding 
that a comparable increase in the number of stock and stock options increases the borrowing costs by 8 
bps. 
The two size variables are negatively related to SPREAD (the coefficients are -28.496 and -
65.5587 respectively). Large firms are more scrutinized by analysts, thus the information asymmetry, and 
the related risk, is reduced. The coefficient on the second size tercile is 43% smaller than the coefficient 
on the third size tercile in absolute terms: this suggests that the effect of information asymmetry reduction 
on the bond spread is not linear. AGE is negatively related to SPREAD (the coefficient is -0.556 and the 
p-value is 0.062), indicating that firm reputation can reduce the cost of debt. The coefficient on 
PROFITABILITY is also negative and significant (the coefficient is -538.902 and the p-value is 0.002): a 
profitable firm most likely will be able to pay back the lenders, and is thus perceived as less risky. 
Consistent with the intuition that a firm with opportunities for asset substitution activities has a higher 
cost of debt, the coefficient on R&D is positive and significant (the coefficient is 582.195 and the p-value 
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0.0028). However, the coefficient on MARKET-TO-BOOK is negative and significant (the coefficient is 
-7.248 and the p-value 0.093): the negative value seems to indicate that MARKET-TO-BOOK is 
measuring profitability more than growth opportunities.  
The coefficients on BOOK LEVERAGE (the coefficient is 105.107 and the p-value is 0.002) and 
Z-SCORE (the coefficient is -64.507 and the p-value is 0.000) confirm the intuition that firms in financial 
distress face a high cost of debt. This result is consistent with Merton (1974) model for pricing default 
risk on corporate debt, which suggests that cost of debt is positively related to firm leverage and to the 
variance of the underlying assets of the borrower (here measured by the Z-SCORE). Finally, the 
coefficients on MATURITY (the coefficient is 0.454 and the p-value is 0.000) and COLLATERAL (the 
coefficient is 304.892 and the p-value is 0.000) are positive and significant. The coefficient on 
COLLATERAL is consistent with Berger and Udell (1990), and indicates that risky borrowers are 
required to pledge collateral and pay higher spreads. 
Column (2) of Table X shows the coefficients of the regression of SPREAD on DELTA. The 
coefficient on DELTA is positive and significant (the coefficient is 50.225 and the p-value is 0.059). The 
coefficients on the control variables are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the coefficients in 
column (1). In economic terms, the coefficients from column (2) in Table IX implies that, holding 
everything else constant, borrowing costs of a firm with DELTA in the 75th percentile are only 10.7 bps 
higher than the borrowing costs of a firm with DELTA in the 25th percentile.  
Columns (2) and (3) of Table X present the result of the regression of SPREAD on the 
managerial incentive compensation variables on the sample of bank borrowers. As predicted by the 
model, there is no relation between incentive compensation and the cost of bank loans. 16 This finding 
suggests that banks are not worried about the asset substitution behavior induced by incentive 
                                                 
16
 For this test I delete all the observation where the variable COLLATERAL is missing. In unreported tests, I set 
COLLATERAL to 0 whenever the variable is missing. That allows me to increase the sample size to 631 
observations. The coefficients do not change significantly. Most importantly, the coefficients on the incentive 
compensation variables are still not significant. 
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compensation, possibly because they can reduce the manager incentives to asset substitution through 
monitoring.  
 
6.2.2   Incentive alignment and spread: robustness checks 
I next consider a scenario where CEO’s incentive compensation is endogenous. As Ortiz-Molina 
(2005) points out, there could be a risk factor correlated with incentive compensation and cost of debt. 
Alternatively, firm risk may affect the structure of the CEO compensation package. To address the issue, I 
estimate the model with a two-stage least square regression of SPREAD, treating the incentive variables 
as endogenous. I use incentive compensation on the year before the financing event and CEO tenure as 
instruments PPS and DELTA. The economic rationale of using past PPS and DELTA as instruments for 
current incentive compensation is that past incentive compensation should not be related to SPREAD, 
because lenders are only interested in the CEO’s incentive structure at the time the loan is negotiated. 
Palia (2001) suggests CEO experience as instrument for pay-performance-sensitivity.17 As before, I test 
the relevance and validity of the instruments: Table XI reports the results of the tests for both the public 
and private sample. The partial R2 always falls within 0.226 and 0.658, while the F statistics are all above 
14. Additionally, the Hansen J statistic fails to reject the null that the instruments are orthogonal to the 
error process. I can conclude that the instruments are relevant and valid. Finally, the C statistic fails to 
reject the null that PPS and DELTA are exogenous in all cases. Thus, I use pooled OLS as primary 
estimation method. 
The results for private borrowers may be affected by the choice to aggregate tranches that belong 
to the same deal, and to calculate weighted spreads and maturities. In unreported tests, I re-estimate the 
coefficients of the regressions using sub samples with revolvers only, largest tranches and whole deals 
only, whole deals only. I have only 59 observations of term loans, thus I cannot perform any test on that 
                                                 
17
 See Section 6.1.2. 
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sub sample. The results of the regressions on these private loans sub samples do not change: PPS and 
DELTA are not related to SPREAD. 18 
In summary, the results from Table X support the model prediction that the relation between cost 
of debt and incentive compensation is positive in the public sample, and non significant in the bank 
sample. This finding is consistent with the intuition that public lenders account for the manager’s 
incentives to invest in risky assets by looking at his compensation package, and charge a higher spread to 
be compensated for the expected asset substitution. The results are also consistent with my model’ 
prediction that banks can limit the manager’s incentives to asset substitution trough monitoring, thus 
eliminating the need to charge the firm a higher interest rate.  
 
6.3.1   Incentive alignment and collateral 
I now turn to examine the relation between managerial incentive compensation and the inclusion 
of a collateral provision in the debt contract. The model predicts a positive relation between incentive 
compensation and the probability that a collateral provision is included in the debt contract. I test these 
predictions with a logistic regression of the dummy variable COLLATERAL on incentive and control 
variables. I test the hypothesis on the private sample only because the model predicts that collateral is 
only used by banks. Additionally, only 1% of public borrowers collateralized their bond issue in my 
sample. 
Table XII shows the coefficients of a logistic regression of COLLATERAL on PPS and DELTA. 
The main result in Column (1) is that PPS is positively related to the probability that a collateral provision 
is included in the debt contract (the coefficient is 0.283 and the p-value 0.077). This finding supports the 
hypothesis that lenders use the collateral provision to limit manager’s incentives for asset substitution. 
                                                 
18
 Another possible source of bias in the regression is the selection of the variable Collateral: because selection is 
unobserved, the effect of Collateral on Spread could be confounded by the unknown factors affecting the 
collateralization decision. I use a treatment effect model à la Heckmann to correct for the selection bias. In the 
public sample, the coefficient on the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) is significant, indicating that the treatment effect 
model should be used. However, the coefficients are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the OLS coefficients. 
For the private sample, the coefficient on the IML is not significant – OLS can be safely used. 
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The coefficients on the size terciles are negative and significant (the coefficients are -1.038 and -1.600): 
large firms are less risky for lenders because there is less information asymmetry. The coefficients on 
BOOK LEVERAGE and RETURNS VOLATILITY (4.362 and 0.612 respectively) and tangibility (the 
coefficient is -.2635 and the p-value is 0.060) indicate that firms with lower credit quality or high overall 
risk have to pledge collateral. Finally, loans with longer maturity require the collateral provision (the 
coefficient on MATURITY is 0.347 and the p-value 0.041). In economic term the coefficients from 
column (1) imply that a firm with PPS in the 75th percentile is 2.3 times more likely to collateralize the 
loan than a firm with PPS in the 25th percentile.  
Column (2) reports the coefficient of the logistic regression of COLLATERAL on DELTA. The 
coefficient on DELTA is positive and significant (the coefficient is 3.862 and the p-value 0.044). The 
effect of DELTA on the collateralization decision is quite significant: the coefficient implies that a firm 
with DELTA in the 75th percentile is 10 times more likely to include a collateral provision in the loan 
contract than a firm with DELTA in the 25th percentile. In column (3) I set the variable COLLATERAL 
to 0 whenever the observation is missing. This allows me to increase the sample size to 631. The results 
are similar, although now the coefficient on PPS is not significant. 
These findings are consistent with the intuition that banks can include a collateral provision in the 
contract to reduce the incentives to asset substitution of an aligned manager. My results seem to indicate 
that public lenders price the manager’s incentives to asset substitution, while banks limit those incentives 
by monitoring the firm and sometimes also by including a collateral provision. These findings are 
consistent with monitoring and collateral being complementary mechanisms to limit managerial 
incentives for asset substitution activities. 19   
 
 
                                                 
19
 Anecdotal evidence shows that firms sometime pledge their receivables as collateral. Because the value of 
receivables depends directly on the firm operations, lenders will have even more incentive to monitor the firm and 
the value of the collateral. 
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7. Conclusion 
I develop a model to explain the relation between managerial incentive compensation and the 
choice between public and private debt. Stock holdings and stock options align managers’ and owners’ 
incentives, and induce managers to take risk to maximize shareholder value. Public lenders anticipate the 
risk-shifting incentives embedded in managers’ compensation, and include the information in the pricing 
of new bond issues. Banks, on the other hand, reduce managers’ asset substitution incentives ex-ante, by 
monitoring the project choices and punishing the firm that deviates from the efficient investment 
decisions. Thus, banks do not price risk-shifting incentives. Banks can also limit managers’ risk-shifting 
incentives by collateralizing the loan. The model predicts that managers whose compensation is tied to 
firm performance choose bank loans and submit to bank monitoring as a commitment mechanism to 
reduce the cost of debt. 
 I empirically investigate the role of managerial incentive compensation as a determinant of the 
choice between bank debt and public bonds for a sample of 2198 new debt financings over the period 
1992-2005. I also investigate the impact of managerial incentive compensation on lenders’ pricing and 
collateralization decisions, distinguishing between public lenders and banks. I find that the choice of debt 
instrument is strongly related to the incentive alignment between manager and shareholders. Managers 
with a strong incentive component in the compensation package seem to prefer bank debt as source of 
new financing. I also find that the offering yield of public bonds is strongly related to the manager’s 
incentive compensation, while the overall cost of bank loans is not. Consistent with a risk-reducing role 
of collateral, I find that bank loans are collateralized more often if managerial incentive compensation is 
high. These findings support the hypothesis that aligned managers choose bank debt and submit to bank 
monitoring as a commitment mechanism to limit the asset substitution incentives and reduce the cost of 
debt. Monitoring and collateralization seem to be complementary mechanisms to limit asset substitution. 
My results raise interesting questions for future research. There are mechanisms other than bank 
monitoring to limit the asset substitution incentives, and the related cost of debt, of an aligned manager. 
Debt covenants can play an important role in limiting the manager’s flexibility, while convertible debt can 
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directly change the manager’s incentives by giving lenders the opportunity to share the potential profits of 
asset substitution activities. Investigation of these alternatives could improve our understanding of the 
firm financing choices.  
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Table I 
Variable Definitions 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
%NEW BANK: private loans as a percentage of total new debt (public and private) for a given year. 
RATE PAID: fixed equivalent of a floating rate. For private loans, it is computed as SPREAD plus the 
then one-month LIBOR and the then prevailing rate for the Treasury bond with the same maturity of 
the loan, minus the then three-month Treasury rate; for public bonds, RATE PAID is the bond offering 
yield. It is measured in basis points.  
SPREAD: for private loans, it is the cost for the borrower of each dollar withdrawn as a spread on the 
libor/prime base rate; for public bonds, it is the spread on the comparable Treasury bond. The spread is 
measured in basis points. In the case of private loans with multiple facilities, SPREAD is calculated as 
a weighted average of the SPREAD of each facility. The weights are given by the ratio of each facility 
dollar amount and the total deal dollar amount. 
COLLATERAL: dummy variable equal to 1 if the bond/loan is collateralized, 0 otherwise. 
 
MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES 
PPS: Pay-Performance-Sensitivity. PPS is the sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio to firm value, and is 
computed as the dollar increase in the value of the manager’s equity portfolio for a $1,000 increase in 
firm value. It is calculated as:  
 
000,1** 





+= delta
 sharesgoutstandin of # 
held  stockcommon firm on  options of #
 sharesgoutstandin of # 
 sheld sharesof #PPS  
 
DELTA: dollar change in option value for a $1 increase in stock price. Following Core and Guay (2002) 
it is computed as: 
 
[ ]
( ) ( )[ ] ( )2/12 /2//ln TdrTXSZ
ZNeDELTA dT
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=
−
 
 
     where  N is the cumulative probability function for the normal distribution, S is the stock price, X is 
the exercise price, σ  is  the expected stock-return volatility over the life of the option, r is the natural 
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logarithm of the  risk-free interest rate, T is the time to maturity of the option in years, and d is the 
natural logarithm of expected dividend yield over the life of the option. 
 
LOAN AND BOND CHARACTERISTICS 
DEAL: deal dollar amount. 
MATURITY: maturity of the bond/loan in years. In the case of private loans with multiple facilities, the 
maturity is calculated as a weighted average of the maturities of each facility. The weights are given 
by the ratio of each facility dollar amount and the total deal dollar amount. 
 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
AGE: number of years since inclusion in Compustat North America. 
BLOCK: dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one shareholder holds 5% or more of the shares 
outstanding, 0 otherwise. 
INTEREST COVERAGE: operating income before depreciation to interest expense. 
LOSS: dummy variable equal to 1 if the operating income before depreciation is negative, 0 otherwise. 
BOOK LEVERAGE:  total liabilities divided by total assets. 
MARKET-TO-BOOK: book value of debt plus market value of common and preferred stock divided by 
total assets. 
PROFITABILITY: operating income before depreciation to total assets. 
RETURNS VOLATILITY: moving standard deviation of daily returns on a window of 30 days. 
R&D: R&D expense to total assets. 
TANGIBILITY: net property, plant and equipment to total assets. 
SIZE: firm total assets in $ million. 
Z-SCORE: Defined as in Altman (1981) as: ++
Assets Total
Earnings Retained
*1.4
Assets Total
Capital Working
*1.2  
 
sLiabilitie of Value Market
Equity of Value Market
Assets Total
Sales
*0.999
Sales
EBIT
*3.3 *6.0+++ .   
%EXISTING PRIVATE DEBT: existing bank debt to total assets. 
 
MACRO VARIABLES 
INTEREST VOLATILITY: Monthly average of the 12-month moving standard deviation of daily yields 
on 10-years U.S. T-bonds. 
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Table II 
Characteristics of loan facilities 
 
The private sample consists of 631 U.S. dollar-denominated bank loans to U.S. non financial corporations between 1992 and 2005.Panel A presents the different 
type of deals; Panel B shows the different type of facilities (tranche-level analysis); Panel C shows the facility purpose (tranche-level analysis). 
 
Panel A - Deal Type   Panel B - Facility Type   Panel C -  Facility Purpose 
Deal Type Frequency Percentage 
  
Facility type Frequency Percentage   Facility Purpose Frequency Percentage 
   
 
       
Bilateral 1 0.12 
 
364-Day Facility 271 33.46  Acquisition line 33 4.07 
N/A 2 0.25 
 
Bridge Loan 3 0.37  CP backup 160 19.75 
Sole Lender 16 1.98 
 
Demand Loan 1 0.12  Capital expenditure 1 0.12 
Syndication 789 97.65 
 
Other Loan 1 0.12  Corporate purposes 298 36.79 
   
 
Revolver/Line < 1 Yr. 22 2.72  Debt Repayment 13 1.60 
   
 
Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 437 53.95  Debtor-in-possession  5 0.62 
   
 
Revolver/Term Loan 2 0.25  Equipment Purchase 1 0.12 
   
 
Synthetic Lease 2 0.25  LBO/MBO 13 1.60 
   
 
Term Loan 45 5.56  Lease finance 3 0.37 
   
 
Term Loan A 10 1.23  Other 7 0.86 
   
 
Term Loan B 13 1.60  Project finance 1 0.12 
   
 
Term Loan C 1 0.12  Real estate 2 0.25 
   
 
Term Loan D 1 0.12  Recapitalization 3 0.37 
   
 
Term Loan E 1 0.12  Spinoff 1 0.12 
   
 
    
Stock buyback 12 1.48 
   
 
   
 
Takeover 158 19.51 
   
 
   
 
Trade finance 1 0.12 
   
 
   
 
Working capital 98 12.10 
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Table III 
Number of facilities  
 
The private sample consists of 631 U.S. dollar-denominated bank loans to U.S. non financial corporations between 1992 and 2005.Panel A presents the 
percentage of repeated borrowers in the whole, private and public sample respectively; Panel B shows the average, median, min and max number of deals per 
company in the sample period. 
 
Panel A  - % repeated borrowers  Panel B - # number of deals 
# of loans/bond issues Whole Private Public  # of loans/bond issues per company Whole Private Public 
      
   
1 0.442 0.656 0.358  Mean 3.204 1.585 3.363 
 
   
  
   
2 0.192 0.191 0.232  Median 2 1 2 
 
   
  
   
3 0.087 0.090 0.112  Min 1 1 1 
 
   
  
   
>3 0.278 0.063 0.298  Max 30 6 30 
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Table IV 
Univariate analysis of debt characteristics 
 
The private sample consists of 631 U.S. dollar-denominated bank loans to U.S. non financial corporations between 
1992 and 2005; the public sample consists of 1567 public bonds issued in the U.S. by U.S. non financial 
corporations between 1992 and 2005. Deal Amount is total amount of the loan/bond in $ million; Deal/TA is deal 
amount to total assets; Deal/TD is deal amount divided by the sum of the firm current liabilities and long term debt. 
For firms in the private sample Spread, computed in basis points (bps), is the sum of spread over the LIBOR and any 
other annual fee; for firms in the public sample Spread is the spread over a Treasury bond of comparable maturity. 
For firms in the private sample Rate Paid, computed in basis points (bps), is the sum of spread over LIBOR (or 
Prime) and any other annual fee, plus then prevailing one-month LIBOR and rate for the Treasury bond with the 
same maturity of the loan, minus then prevailing three-month Treasury rate; for firms in the public sample Rate Paid 
is the bond offering yield. Maturity is maturity of the loan/bond in years. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
1%. Panel A presents the sample means (medians in parentheses); p-values are from a Kruskal-Wallis test of 
equality across categories. Panel B, C, and D report mean, standard deviation, min, max, 25th, 50th, and 75th 
percentile of debt characteristics for the whole sample, the private sample, and the public sample respectively. 
 
PANEL A - Test of sample differences 
New debt issues Full sample Bank Debt Public Debt p-values for equality 
characteristics N=2198 N=631 N=1567 across categories 
     
Total Issue Volume (in $ million) 1,020,794 441,953 578,840  
     
Deal Amount (in $ million) 464.419 700.401 369.394 0.049 
 (300.000) (300.000) (275.000)  
Deal/TA 0.101 0.199 0.062 0.000 
 (0.050) (0.131) (0.036)  
Deal/TD 0.204 0.434 0.111 0.000 
 (0.083) (0.234) (0.056)  
Spread (in bps) 138.119 81.050 161.100 0.000 
 (98.000) (55.000) (112.500)  
Rate Paid (in bps) 655.555 599.550 678.107 0.000 
 (670.747) (640.114) (686.000)  
Maturity (in years) 10.465 2.920 13.504 0.000 
 (7.008) (3.000) (10.001)  
Fraction with Collateral 0.065 0.386 0.010 0.000 
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Table IV (continued) 
 
PANEL B – Whole Sample (N=2198) 
New debt issues Mean Std Min Max 25th 50th 75th 
characteristics        
       
 
Deal (in $ million) 464.419 652.469 10 7,000 175 300 500 
Deal/TA 0.101 0.141 0.003 1.168 0.024 0.050 0.120 
Deal/TD 0.204 0.400 0.015 150.000 0.067 0.170 0.457 
Spread (in bps) 138.119 120.487 15 640 60 98 175 
Rate Paid (in bps) 655.555 160.033 206.652 1,125.00 568.587 670.747 747.694 
Maturity (in years) 10.465 11.775 1 99.999 4.996 7.008 10.008 
 
 
 
PANEL C - Private Sample (N=631) 
New debt issues Mean Std Min Max 25th 50th 75th 
characteristics        
       
 
Deal (in $ million) 700.401 1079.036 10 7000 128 300 800 
Deal/TA 0.199 0.211 0.008 1.168 0.062 0.131 0.253 
Deal/TD 0.434 0.612 0.022 150.000 0.200 0.519 1.246 
Spread (in bps) 81.050 69.616 15 325 30 55 110 
Rate Paid (in bps) 599.550 155.336 206.652 901.760 485.164 640.114 705.243 
Maturity (in years) 2.920 1.758 1 6.679 1.000 3.000 5.000 
 
 
 
PANEL D - Public Sample (N=1567) 
New debt issues Mean Std Min Max 25th 50th 75th 
characteristics        
       
 
Deal (in $ million) 369.394 312.047 75 2000 200 275 500 
Deal/TA 0.062 0.069 0.003 0.373 0.019 0.036 0.075 
Deal/TD 0.111 0.210 0.015 6.048 0.055 0.121 0.269 
Spread (in bps) 161.100 128.749 30 640 73 113 205 
Rate Paid (in bps) 678.107 156.365 269.000 1125.000 600.000 686.000 763.000 
Maturity (in years) 13.504 12.693 2.008 99.999 7.000 10.001 12.007 
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Table V 
Univariate statistics of firm characteristics 
 
The private sample consists of 631 U.S. dollar-denominated bank loans to U.S. non financial corporations between 
1992 and 2005; the public sample consists of 1567 public bonds issued in the U.S. by U.S. non financial 
corporations between 1992 and 2005. PPS (Pay Performance Sensitivity) is the dollar increase in the value of the 
manager’s portfolio for a $1,000 increase in firm value; Delta is the dollar increase in the value of the manager’s 
stock options for a $1 increase in the stock price; Size is total assets of the firm in $ million;  Age is number of years 
since first record in Compustat; Profitability is operating income before depreciation to total assets; Market-to-Book 
ratio is book value of debt plus market value of common and preferred stock divided by total assets;  R&D is R&D 
expenditures to total assets; Book Leverage is  liabilities divided by total assets; Interest Coverage is operating 
income before depreciation to interest expense; Z-Score is defined as in Altman (1981): (3.3*EBIT/Sales + 
0.999*Sales/Total Assets + 1.4*Retained Earnings/Total Assets + 1.2*Working Capital/Total Assets + 0.6*Market 
Value of Equity/ Market Value of Liabilities);  Returns Volatility is the moving standard deviation of daily returns 
on a window of 30 days (in percentage);  Tangibility is property, plant and equipment to total assets. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1%. Panel A presents the sample means (medians in parentheses); p-values are from a 
Kruskal-Wallis test of equality across categories. Panel B, C, and D report mean, standard deviation, min, max, 25th, 
50th, and 75th percentile of firm characteristics for the whole sample, the private sample, and the public sample 
respectively. 
 
PANEL A - Test of sample differences 
Sample firms Full sample Private Debt Public Debt p-values for equality 
characteristics N=2198 N=631 N=1567 across categories 
     
PPS 16.481 20.050 15.043 0.000 
 (5.681) (7.317) (5.001)  
Delta 0.647 0.650 0.646 0.233 
 (0.642) (0.647) (0.640)  
Size (in $ million) 13,756 7,338 16,340 0.000 
 (6051) (2459) (7908)  
Age 40.383 37.602 41.503 0.000 
 (47.000) (45.000) (48.000)  
Profitability 0.039 0.040 0.039 0.202 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.036)  
Market-to-Book 1.849 2.018 1.781 0.000 
 (1.493) (1.582) (1.454)  
R&D 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Book Leverage 0.195 0.161 0.208 0.000 
 
(0.178) (0.149) (0.192)  
Interest Coverage 14.167 22.818 10.683 0.027 
 (6.757) (7.492) (6.586)  
Z-Score 3.449 4.191 3.151 0.000 
 (2.967) (3.384) (2.764)  
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Table V (continued) 
 
PANEL A - Test of sample differences 
Sample firms Full sample Private Debt Public Debt p-values for equality 
characteristics N=2198 N=631 N=1567 across categories 
     
Returns Volatility 2.178 2.363 2.103 0.000 
 (1.923) (2.033) (1.886)  
Tangibility 0.370 0.334 0.385 0.000 
 (0.319) (0.265) (0.347)  
Fraction with Op. Profit <0 0.087 0.101 0.081 0.125 
Fraction with block holder 0.733 0.731 0.735 0.850 
 
 
 
PANEL B - Whole Sample (N=2198) 
Sample firms 
characteristics 
Mean Std Min Max 25th 50th 75th 
        
PPS 16.481 31.439 0.377 211.912 2.463 5.681 13.886 
Delta 0.647 0.093 0.414 0.840 0.580 0.642 0.718 
Size (in $ million) 13,755.98 25,220.000 114.16 216,548.70 2,100.90 6,051.28 15,616.00 
Age 40.383 13.900 8.000 56.000 31.000 47.000 51.000 
Profitability 0.039 0.022 -0.046 0.126 0.026 0.037 0.051 
Market-to-Book 1.849 1.092 0.818 8.340 1.196 1.493 2.081 
R&D 0.005 0.011 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.005 
Book Leverage 0.195 0.121 0.000 0.551 0.103 0.178 0.272 
Interest Coverage 14.167 38.027 -2.431 536.500 3.832 6.757 12.615 
Z-Score 3.449 2.375 -0.225 19.389 1.906 2.967 4.320 
Returns Volatility 2.178 1.020 0.751 6.721 1.468 1.923 2.621 
Tangibility 0.370 0.225 0.012 0.913 0.012 0.319 0.529 
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Table V (continued) 
 
PANEL C - Private Sample (N=631) 
Sample firms 
characteristics 
Mean Std Min Max 25th 50th 75th 
        
PPS 20.050 35.366 0.455 211.912 3.504 7.317 19.881 
Delta 0.650 0.101 0.414 0.840 0.572 0.647 0.729 
Size (in $ million) 7,338.48 12,711.000 114.16 79,467.00 800.20 2,459.03 8,193.00 
Age 37.602 14.744 8.000 56.000 28.000 45.000 50.000 
Profitability 0.040 0.026 -0.046 0.126 0.025 0.038 0.053 
Market-to-Book 2.018 1.346 0.825 8.340 1.254 1.582 2.246 
R&D 0.007 0.014 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.008 
Book Leverage 0.161 0.119 0.000 0.511 0.067 0.149 0.229 
Interest Coverage 22.818 66.773 -2.431 536.500 3.750 7.492 14.760 
Z-Score 4.191 3.013 0.332 19.389 2.223 3.384 4.895 
Returns Volatility 2.363 1.181 0.751 6.721 1.528 2.033 2.916 
Tangibility 0.334 0.221 0.021 0.901 0.021 0.265 0.471 
 
 
PANEL D - Public Sample (N=1567) 
Sample firms 
characteristics 
Mean Std Min Max 25th 50th 75th 
        
PPS 15.043 29.602 0.377 183.204 2.295 5.001 11.931 
Delta 0.646 0.089 0.447 0.838 0.582 0.640 0.713 
Size (in $ million) 16,340.19 28,356 479 216,548 3,295 7,907 17,912 
Age 41.503 13.388 10.000 56.000 34.000 48.000 52.000 
Profitability 0.039 0.020 -0.027 0.104 0.026 0.036 0.050 
Market-to-Book 1.781 0.964 0.818 5.801 1.181 1.454 2.020 
R&D 0.004 0.010 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.004 
Book Leverage 0.208 0.119 0.006 0.551 0.118 0.192 0.283 
Interest Coverage 10.683 13.881 0.000 88.316 3.847 6.586 11.888 
Z-Score 3.151 1.988 -0.225 11.388 1.773 2.764 4.110 
Returns Volatility 2.103 0.938 0.783 5.930 1.446 1.886 2.482 
Tangibility 0.385 0.225 0.012 0.913 0.012 0.347 0.539 
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Table VI 
OLS Regression of %New Bank 
 
The sample consists of 631 U.S. dollar-denominated bank loans to U.S. non financial corporations and 1567 public 
bonds issued in the U.S. by U.S. non financial corporations between 1992 and 2005. %New Bank is new bank debt 
to total new debt. PPS (Pay Performance Sensitivity) is the natural logarithm of the dollar increase in the value of 
the manager’s portfolio for a $1,000 increase in firm value; Delta is the natural logarithm of the dollar increase in 
the value of the manager’s stock options for a $1 increase in the stock price; % Existing Bank Debt is existing bank 
debt to total assets; Size 2 and Size 3 are dummy variables for the second and third tercile of the firm size, where 
Size is total assets $ million; Age is number of years since first record in Compustat; Block is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if at least one shareholder holds 5% or more of the shares outstanding, 0 otherwise; Profitability is 
operating income to total assets; Market-to-Book ratio is book value of debt plus market value of common and 
preferred stock divided by total assets;  R&D is R&D expenditures to total assets; Book Leverage is  liabilities 
divided by total assets; Interest Coverage is operating income to interest expense; Z-Score is defined the natural 
logarithm of (3.3*EBIT/Sales+0.999*Sales/Total Assets+1.4*Retained Earnings/Total Assets+1.2*Working 
Capital/Total Assets+0.6*Market Value of Equity/ Market Value of Liabilities);  Returns Volatility is the moving 
standard deviation of daily returns on a window of 30 days; Maturity is maturity of the loan/bond in years; Deal 
Amount is the natural logarithm of the total amount of the loan/bond in $ million. Industry dummies are based on the 
first two digits of the NAICS code. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%.Columns (1) to (4) present 
estimated coefficients (p-values) from OLS regressions of %New Bank.  Standard errors are robust and clustered by 
firm. 
 
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables N=2198 N=2198 N=713 N=713 
     
Intercept -0.242** -0.064 -0.589*** 0.097 
 (0.045) (0.617) (0.002) (0.696) 
PPS 0.041**  0.064**  
 (0.034)  (0.013)  
PPS^2 -0.009**  -0.008  
 (0.029)  (0.246)  
Delta  0.762**  1.428** 
  (0.028)  (0.018) 
Delta^2  0.925***  1.289** 
  (0.008)  (0.027) 
% Existing Bank Debt   0.259** 0.267*** 
   (0.012) (0.008) 
Size 2 -0.236*** -0.230*** -0.132*** -0.147*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size 3 -0.306*** -0.315*** -0.175*** -0.207*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.804) (0.992) (0.238) (0.797) 
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Table VI (continued) 
 
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables N=2198 N=2198 N=713 N=713 
     
Block -0.028 -0.018 -0.016 0.007 
 (0.190) (0.372) (0.529) (0.783) 
Profitability -1.285*** -1.227** 0.318 0.184 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.652) (0.792) 
Market-to-Book 0.007 0.007 -0.032** -0.042** 
 (0.541) (0.574) (0.050) (0.012) 
R&D 1.288 1.163 0.241 0.029 
 (0.195) (0.251) (0.855) (0.982) 
Book Leverage -0.509*** -0.532*** -0.307** -0.341*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.005) 
Z-Score 0.064** 0.066** 0.068 0.071 
 (0.046) (0.034) (0.212) (0.184) 
Returns Volatility 0.016 0.015 0.003 0.001 
 (0.130) (0.142) (0.844) (0.935) 
Maturity -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Deal Amount 0.091*** 0.088*** 0.101*** 0.095*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R2 0.365 0.367 0.274 0.276 
     
Significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels. 
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Table VII 
Test for endogeneity of PPS, Delta, and %New Bank 
 
The sample consists of 631 U.S. dollar-denominated bank loans to U.S. non financial corporations and 1567 public 
bonds issued in the U.S. by U.S. non financial corporations between 1992 and 2005. The table reports statistics from 
tests for relevance and validity of instruments. Shea partial R2, partial R2, and F-statistics of joint significance of the 
instruments in the first stage test provide tests of instrument relevance. The Hansen J statistic tests the exogeneity of 
instruments for validity. Difference in Sargan C statistic tests the exogeneity of the endogenous variables. 
 
 PPS PPS^2 Delta Delta^2 
  N=1427 N=1464 
 
    
Instruments: CEO tenure, PPS (Delta) on the previous year, sales growth. 
     
Shea Partial R2 0.014 0.011 0.002 0.002 
Partial R2 0.532 0.414 0.333 0.305 
F 140.960*** 56.120*** 91.370*** 77.700*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen J  0.215 1.111 0.322 0.327 
 (0.898) (0.574) (0.851) (0.849) 
C statistic  1.273 0.377 0.008 0.002 
 (0.259) (0.539) (0.930) (0.965) 
     
Significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels. 
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Table VIII 
OLS Regression of %NEW BANK – Truncation on Size and Maturity 
 
The sample consists of 631 U.S. dollar-denominated bank loans to U.S. non financial corporations and 1567 public 
bonds issued in the U.S. by U.S. non financial corporations between 1992 and 2005. %New Bank is new bank debt 
to total new debt. PPS (Pay Performance Sensitivity) is the natural logarithm of the dollar increase in the value of 
the manager’s portfolio for a $1,000 increase in firm value; Delta is the natural logarithm of the dollar increase in 
the value of the manager’s stock options for a $1 increase in the stock price; % Existing Bank Debt is existing bank 
debt to total assets; Size 2 and Size 3 are dummy variables for the second and third tercile of the firm size, where 
Size is total assets $ million; Age is number of years since first record in Compustat; Block is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if at least one shareholder holds 5% or more of the shares outstanding, 0 otherwise; Profitability is 
operating income to total assets; Market-to-Book ratio is book value of debt plus market value of common and 
preferred stock divided by total assets;  R&D is R&D expenditures to total assets; Book Leverage is  liabilities 
divided by total assets; Interest Coverage is operating income to interest expense; Z-Score is defined the natural 
logarithm of (3.3*EBIT/Sales+0.999*Sales/Total Assets+1.4*Retained Earnings/Total Assets+1.2*Working 
Capital/Total Assets+0.6*Market Value of Equity/ Market Value of Liabilities);  Returns Volatility is the moving 
standard deviation of daily returns on a window of 30 days; Maturity is maturity of the loan/bond in years; Deal 
Amount is the natural logarithm of the total amount of the loan/bond in $ million. Industry dummies are based on the 
first two digits of the NAICS code. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. Columns (1) and (2), (3) and (4) , 
and (5) and (6) present estimated coefficients (p-values) from OLS regressions of %New Bank on the main sample 
truncated at 10% on firm size, maturity, and both firm size and maturity respectively. Standard errors are robust and 
clustered by firm. 
 
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables N=1759 N=1759 N=1770 N=1770 N=1407 N=1407 
       
Intercept -0.521*** -0.332** -0.182 -0.006 -0.558*** -0.373** 
 (0.000) (0.034) (0.152) (0.964) (0.000) (0.017) 
PPS 0.025  0.039**  0.014  
 (0.307)  (0.039)  (0.565)  
PPS^2 -0.008  -0.009**  -0.006  
 (0.105)  (0.025)  (0.200)  
Delta  1.015**  0.774**  1.058*** 
  (0.016)  (0.019)  (0.004) 
Delta^2  1.142***  0.933***  1.199*** 
  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.002) 
Size 2 -0.164*** -0.156*** -0.255*** -0.247*** -0.182*** -0.172*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size 3 -0.270*** -0.262*** -0.313*** -0.319*** -0.270*** -0.257*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.510) (0.237) (0.701) (0.908) (0.371) (0.153) 
Block -0.029 -0.027 -0.021 -0.012 -0.029 -0.026 
 (0.205) (0.225) (0.319) (0.566) (0.196) (0.222) 
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Table VIII (continued) 
 
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables N=1759 N=1759 N=1770 N=1770 N=1407 N=1407 
       
Profitability -0.928 -0.818 -0.948* -0.912 -0.059 0.012 
 (0.116) (0.164) (0.087) (0.103) (0.926) (0.985) 
Market-to-Book 0.014 0.014 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.011 
 (0.321) (0.337) (0.502) (0.531) (0.529) (0.477) 
R&D 0.346 0.231 0.824 0.658 -0.869 -0.946 
 (0.775) (0.849) (0.409) (0.518) (0.440) (0.390) 
Book Leverage -0.451*** -0.474*** -0.466*** -0.488*** -0.388*** -0.406*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Z-Score 0.037 0.040 0.044 0.045 0.009 0.011 
 (0.283) (0.242) (0.149) (0.139) (0.783) (0.728) 
Returns Volatility 0.002 0.000 0.015 0.015 0.001 0.000 
 (0.892) (0.990) (0.135) (0.138) (0.907) (0.976) 
Maturity -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.017*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Deal Amount 0.158*** 0.157*** 0.098*** 0.096*** 0.180*** 0.179*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R2 0.349 0.352 0.423 0.425 0.425 0.430 
 
      
Significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels. 
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Table IX 
2SLS Regression of %NEW BANK – Endogeneity of Spread 
 
The sample consists of 631 U.S. dollar-denominated bank loans to U.S. non financial corporations and 1567 public 
bonds issued in the U.S. by U.S. non financial corporations between 1992 and 2005. %New Bank is new bank debt 
to total new debt. For firms in the private sample Spread, computed in basis points (bps), is the sum of spread over 
the LIBOR and any other annual fee; for firms in the public sample Spread is the spread over a Treasury bond of 
comparable maturity. PPS (Pay Performance Sensitivity) is the natural logarithm of the dollar increase in the value 
of the manager’s portfolio for a $1,000 increase in firm value; Delta is the natural logarithm of the dollar increase in 
the value of the manager’s stock options for a $1 increase in the stock price; % Existing Bank Debt is existing bank 
debt to total assets; Size 2 and Size 3 are dummy variables for the second and third tercile of the firm size, where 
Size is total assets $ million; Age is number of years since first record in Compustat; Block is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if at least one shareholder holds 5% or more of the shares outstanding, 0 otherwise; Profitability is 
operating income to total assets; Market-to-Book ratio is book value of debt plus market value of common and 
preferred stock divided by total assets;  R&D is R&D expenditures to total assets; Book Leverage is  liabilities 
divided by total assets; Interest Coverage is operating income to interest expense; Z-Score is defined the natural 
logarithm of (3.3*EBIT/Sales+0.999*Sales/Total Assets+1.4*Retained Earnings/Total Assets+1.2*Working 
Capital/Total Assets+0.6*Market Value of Equity/ Market Value of Liabilities);  Returns Volatility is the moving 
standard deviation of daily returns on a window of 30 days; Maturity is maturity of the loan/bond in years; Deal 
Amount is the natural logarithm of the total amount of the loan/bond in $ million. Dividend is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the company pays dividend, 0 otherwise; Interest Volatility is the monthly average of the 12-month 
moving standard deviation of daily yields on 10-years U.S. T-bonds. Industry dummies are based on the first two 
digits of the NAICS code. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. Columns (1) and (2) present estimated 
coefficients (p-values) from 2SLS regressions of %New Bank. Instruments for the endogenous variable Spread are 
Dividend and Interest Volatility. Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm. 
 
Panel A: 2SLS regression  Panel B: tests for endogeneity 
Independent (1) (2)  Statistics (1) (2) 
Variables N=2185 N=2185   N=2185 N=2185 
       
Intercept -0.121 0.061  Partial R2 0.022 0.021 
 (0.562) (0.808)     
Spread 0.001 0.000  F 10.010 11.250 
 (0.479) (0.579)     
PPS 0.038*   Hansen J 1.447 1.537 
 (0.075)    (0.229) (0.215) 
PPS^2 -0.010**   C statistic 7.057*** 5.973** 
 (0.029)    (0.008) (0.015) 
Delta  0.694*     
  (0.074)     
Delta^2  0.874**  Instruments for Spread: Dividend and Interest 
  (0.022)  Volatility   
Size 2 -0.227*** -0.221***     
 (0.000) (0.000)     
Size 3 -0.282*** -0.292***     
 (0.000) (0.000)     
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Table IX (continued) 
 
Panel A: 2SLS regression  Panel B: tests for endogeneity 
Independent (1) (2)  Statistics (1) (2) 
Variables N=2185 N=2185   N=2185 N=2185 
       
Age 0.000 0.000     
 (0.805) (0.750)     
Block -0.027 -0.019     
 (0.216) (0.357)     
Profitability -1.142** -1.101**     
 (0.034) (0.042)     
Market-to-Book 0.009 0.009     
 (0.457) (0.499)     
R&D 1.131 1.065     
 (0.281) (0.309)     
Book Leverage -0.582*** -0.591***     
 (0.000) (0.000)     
Z-Score 0.098* 0.092     
 (0.099) (0.106)     
Returns Volatility 0.002 0.005     
 (0.927) (0.837)     
Maturity -0.011*** -0.011***     
 (0.000) (0.000)     
Deal Amount 0.094*** 0.090***     
 (0.000) (0.000)     
       
Industry Dummies Yes Yes     
       
Year Dummies Yes Yes     
       
R2 0.310 0.493     
 
      
Significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels.   
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Table X 
OLS Regression of Spread 
 
The private sample consists of 251 U.S. dollar-denominated bank loans to U.S. non financial corporations; the 
public sample consists of and 1476 public bonds issued in the U.S. by U.S. non financial corporations between 1992 
and 2005. For firms in the private sample Spread, computed in basis points (bps), is the sum of spread over the 
LIBOR and any other annual fee; for firms in the public sample Spread is the spread over a Treasury bond of 
comparable maturity. PPS (Pay Performance Sensitivity) is the natural logarithm of the dollar increase in the value 
of the manager’s portfolio for a $1,000 increase in firm value; Delta is the natural logarithm of the dollar increase in 
the value of the manager’s stock options for a $1 increase in the stock price; Size 2 and Size 3 are dummy variables 
for the second and third tercile of the firm size, where Size is total assets $ million; Age is number of years since first 
record in Compustat; Profitability is operating income to total assets; Loss is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
operating income before depreciation is negative, 0 otherwise; Market-to-Book ratio is book value of debt plus 
market value of common and preferred stock divided by total assets;  R&D is R&D expenditures to total assets; 
Book Leverage is  liabilities divided by total assets; Interest Coverage is operating income to interest expense; Z-
Score is defined the natural logarithm of (3.3*EBIT/Sales+0.999*Sales/Total Assets+1.4*Retained Earnings/Total 
Assets+1.2*Working Capital/Total Assets+0.6*Market Value of Equity/ Market Value of Liabilities); Collateral is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the bond/loan is collateralized, 0 otherwise; Returns Volatility is the moving standard 
deviation of daily returns on a window of 30 days; Maturity is maturity of the loan/bond in years; Deal Amount is 
the natural logarithm of the total amount of the loan/bond in $ million. Industry dummies are based on the first two 
digits of the NAICS code. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. Columns (1) and (2) show the coefficients 
(p-values) of OLS regressions of Spread for the public sample; columns (3) and (4) show the coefficients (p-values) 
of OLS regressions of Spread for the private sample. Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm. 
 
  Public Bonds Bank Loans 
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables N=1476 N=1476 N=251 N=251 
     
Intercept 211.038*** 264.610*** 183.066*** 197.092*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PPS 6.991**  2.295  
 (0.025)  (0.487)  
Delta  50.225*  12.546 
  (0.059)  (0.606) 
Size 2 -28.496*** -32.202*** -26.924** -27.454** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.018) (0.015) 
Size 3 -65.587*** -73.469*** -37.960** -39.448*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.010) 
Age -0.566* -0.460 -0.137 -0.138 
 (0.062) (0.143) (0.632) (0.639) 
Profitability -538.902*** -571.633*** 247.605 230.005 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.251) (0.287) 
Loss 5.490 4.949 -1.080 -1.227 
 (0.536) (0.583) (0.934) (0.926) 
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Table X (continued) 
 
  Public Bonds Bank Loans 
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables N=1476 N=1476 N=251 N=251 
     
Market-to-Book -7.248* -8.632* 2.225 2.210 
 (0.093) (0.051) (0.645) (0.648) 
R&D 582.195** 516.343** -238.236 -252.941 
 (0.028) (0.049) (0.368) (0.333) 
Book Leverage 105.107*** 107.618*** -3.717 -2.518 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.906) (0.936) 
Interest Coverage 0.146 0.158 -0.031 -0.030 
 (0.576) (0.539) (0.549) (0.559) 
Z-Score -64.507*** -65.227*** -53.228*** -53.266*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Returns Volatility 36.950*** 36.725*** 7.089 7.172* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.105) (0.098) 
Deal Amount 3.362 1.854 -9.383** -9.824** 
 (0.518) (0.718) (0.040) (0.031) 
Maturity 0.454*** 0.421*** 1.919 2.073 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.417) (0.378) 
Collateral 204.892*** 209.450*** 72.842*** 72.786*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Interest Rate Volatility 42.762 43.831 48.446 48.692 
 (0.138) (0.127) (0.232) (0.231) 
     
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R2 0.607 0.606 0.650 0.649 
 
    
Significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels. 
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Table XI 
Test for endogeneity of PPS, Delta, and Spread 
 
The sample consists of 187 U.S. dollar-denominated bank loans to U.S. non financial corporations and 1427 public 
bonds issued in the U.S. by U.S. non financial corporations between 1992 and 2005. The table reports statistics from 
tests for relevance and validity of instruments. Shea partial R2, partial R2, and F-statistics of joint significance of the 
instruments in the first stage test provide tests of instrument relevance. The Hansen J statistic tests the exogeneity of 
instruments for validity. Difference in Sargan C statistic tests the exogeneity of the endogenous variables. 
 
  Public Sample   Private Sample 
 PPS Delta  PPS Delta 
  N=1427   N=187 
      
Instruments: CEO tenure, PPS (Delta) on the previous year.   
      
Partial R2 0.658 0.382  0.226 0.298 
F 336.450*** 139.850***  14.930*** 44.380*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen J  2.115 0.652  1.099 0.490 
 (0.146) (0.419)  (0.295) (0.484) 
C statistic  0.207 0.737  1.211 0.693 
 (0.649) (0.391)  (0.271) (0.405) 
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Table XII 
Logistic Regression of Collateral 
 
The private sample consists of 251 U.S. dollar-denominated bank loans to U.S. non financial corporations between 
1992 and 2005. Collateral is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bond/loan is collateralized, 0 otherwise; PPS (Pay 
Performance Sensitivity) is the natural logarithm of the dollar increase in the value of the manager’s portfolio for a 
$1,000 increase in firm value; Delta is the natural logarithm of the dollar increase in the value of the manager’s 
stock options for a $1 increase in the stock price; Size 2 and Size 3 are dummy variables for the second and third 
tercile of the firm size, where Size is total assets $ million; Age is number of years since first record in Compustat; 
Profitability is operating income to total assets; Loss is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the operating income before 
depreciation is negative, 0 otherwise; Tangibility is net property, plant and equipment to total asset; Market-to-Book 
ratio is book value of debt plus market value of common and preferred stock divided by total assets;  R&D is R&D 
expenditures to total assets; Book Leverage is  liabilities divided by total assets; Interest Coverage is operating 
income to interest expense; Z-Score is defined the natural logarithm of (3.3*EBIT/Sales+0.999*Sales/Total 
Assets+1.4*Retained Earnings/Total Assets+1.2*Working Capital/Total Assets+0.6*Market Value of Equity/ 
Market Value of Liabilities); Returns Volatility is the moving standard deviation of daily returns on a window of 30 
days; Deal Amount is the natural logarithm of the total amount of the loan/bond in $ million; Maturity is maturity of 
the loan/bond in years. Industry dummies are based on the first two digits of the NAICS code. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1%. Columns (1) and (2) show the coefficients (p-values) of a logistic regression of 
Collateral for the private sample; columns (3) and (4) show the coefficients (p-values) of a logistic regression of 
Collateral for the private sample: here the dummy variable Collateral is set to 0 when the observation is missing. 
Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm. 
 
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables N=242 N=242 N=611 N=611 
     
Intercept 4.043 6.683** -1.493 -0.104 
 (0.109) (0.015) (0.515) (0.965) 
PPS 0.283*  0.099  
 (0.077)  (0.522)  
Delta  3.862**  3.047*** 
  (0.044)  (0.009) 
Size 2 -1.038** -1.008** -1.595*** -1.588*** 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size 3 -1.600** -1.847*** -1.970*** -1.985*** 
 (0.032) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) 
Age -0.015 -0.011 -0.022* -0.017 
 (0.400) (0.498) (0.066) (0.127) 
Profitability -4.923 -3.333 -8.653 -9.304 
 (0.664) (0.765) (0.258) (0.221) 
Tangibility -2.635* -2.615* -0.385 -0.312 
 (0.060) (0.056) (0.687) (0.750) 
Loss 0.594 0.787 0.490 0.572 
 (0.407) (0.277) (0.295) (0.232) 
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Table XII (continued) 
 
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables N=242 N=242 N=611 N=611 
     
Market-to-Book -0.306 -0.345 -0.063 -0.071 
 (0.280) (0.205) (0.803) (0.762) 
R&D -23.301 -26.446 -7.646 -11.494 
 (0.319) (0.288) (0.597) (0.452) 
Book Leverage 4.362* 4.823** 2.321* 2.807* 
 (0.064) (0.044) (0.097) (0.060) 
Interest Coverage 0.001 0.001 0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.621) (0.663) (0.040) (0.025) 
Z-Score -0.400 -0.528 -0.346 -0.455 
 (0.593) (0.486) (0.547) (0.409) 
Returns Volatility 0.612*** 0.629*** 0.437*** 0.420*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Deal Amount -0.447* -0.525** -0.110 -0.143 
 (0.056) (0.038) (0.497) (0.392) 
Maturity 0.347** 0.384** 0.334*** 0.359*** 
 (0.041) (0.022) (0.002) (0.001) 
Interest Rate Volatility 1.292 1.224 2.021 1.701 
 (0.556) (0.587) (0.253) (0.340) 
     
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo R2 0.403 0.415 0.331 0.345 
 
    
Significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Lemma 1. The manager invests in the safe project only if investing in S maximizes his expected 
profit. Thus, the manager solves the inequality ),( ),( rRErSE MNCMNC > ( ),( ),( rRErSE MCMC > ) for the 
interest rate r. Without collateral, that is equivalent to solving 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]rIWZEppW rIWHEqqW +−−++−−>+−−++−− 1111 αξαξ  
 
On the other hand, if the bond is collateralized the inequality becomes 
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]rIWZEpW prIWHEqqW +−−++>+−−++ 11 αα  
 
Solving the inequalities for r leads to Lemma 1. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. This proof has two parts: first I analyze all the feasible outcomes given the 
manager’s reaction function; then I study which outcome prevails for different levels of incentive 
compensation α. 
 
Part 1: Feasible Outcomes 
a) *NCNC rr <  
Bondholders know that if *NCNC rr <  the manager invests in project S. Thus, they charge the interest rate 
that solves equation 0))(1()1(),( =−−+−++= IWEqrqIrSE NCNCL ξ . The solution is 
[ ] 1/))(1( −−+−−= qIWEqIr SNC ξ . To be feasible, the interest rate must be incentive compatible and 
must guarantee a non-negative profit to the manager. SNCr  is incentive compatible only if 
*
NC
S
NC rr < . 
Solving the inequality for the level of incentive compensation α gives the condition for SNCr  to be 
incentive compatible: there is a threshold 0* >NCα such that if 
*
NCαα < , 
*
NC
S
NC rr < , with 
 
( )
( )[ ] ( )[ ]IWqEqHqIWqEqZp
pqq
NC
−−−++−−−−++
−
= ξξ
ξ
α
11
*
 
 
Only when α is below the threshold *NCα  the manager, offered the interest rate 
S
NCr , invests in the safe 
project, and has an expected payoff of [ ]
 0IWqEqHqWrSE SNC
M
NC >−−−+++−−= ξαξ )1()1(),( . 
If α is greater than the threshold *NCα , 
S
NCr  is not feasible: the manager facing the rate 
S
NCr  invests in the 
risky project, and bondholders’ expected profit is negative. Thus, for α greater than the threshold, no 
lender offers SNCr .  
 
b) *NCNC rr >  
Lenders know that if *NCNC rr >  the manager invests in project R. Thus, they find NCr   that solves 
0))(1()1(),( =−−+−++= IWEprpIrRE NCNCL ξ . The rate [ ]  pIWEpIr RNC 1/))(1( −−+−−= ξ  
solves the equation. As before, to be feasible the interest rate must be incentive compatible and guarantee 
a non-negative profit to the manager. RNCr  is incentive compatible only if 
*
NC
R
NC rr > . Solving the 
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inequality for the level of incentive compensation α gives the condition for RNCr  to be incentive 
compatible: there is a threshold 0** >NCα such that if 
**
NCαα > , 
*
NC
R
NC rr > , where 
**
NCα  is 
 
( )
( )[ ] ( )[ ]IWpEpHqIWpEpZp
pqp
NC
−−−++−−−−++
−
= ξξ
ξ
α
11
**
 
 
Only when α is above the threshold **NCα  the manager, offered the interest rate 
R
NCr , invests in the risky 
project, and has an expected payoff of [ ]
 0IWpEpZpWrRE RNC
M
NC >−−−+++−−= ξαξ )1()1(),( . 
If α is below the threshold, RNCr  is not incentive compatible: the manager, offered 
R
NCr , invests in the safe 
project, and bondholders have a positive expected profit. However, because public lenders are 
competitive, another group of investors offers the lower rate SNCr  , and the manager accepts the offer and 
invests in project S because ),(),( RNCMNCSNCMNC rRErSE >   Thus, if α is lower than the threshold, no lender 
offers RNCr .  
 
c) *CC rr <  
Lenders know that if *CC rr <  the manager invests in project S. Thus, they charge Cr  that solves 
equation 0)1()1(),( =−−++= IEqrqIrSE CCL . The solution is [ ]  qIEqIr SC 1/)1( −−−= . The 
interest rate must be incentive compatible and must guarantee a non-negative profit to the manager to be 
feasible. Solving the inequality *C
S
C rr <  for the level of incentive compensation α gives the condition for 
S
Cr  to be incentive compatible: there is a threshold 0
* >Cα such that if 
*
Cαα < , 
*
C
S
C rr < , where 
*
Cα  is 
 
( )
[ ] [ ]IqWEqHqIqWEqZp
Wpqq
C
−−+−−−+
−
=
*α  
 
Only when α is below the threshold *Cα  the manager, offered the interest rate 
S
Cr , invests in the safe 
project, and has an expected payoff of [ ]
 0IqWEqHqWrSE SNC
M
NC >−−++= α),( . If α is greater 
than the threshold *Cα , 
S
Cr  is not feasible: the manager facing a rate of 
S
Cr  invests in the risky project and 
bondholders’ expected profit is negative. Thus, for α greater than the threshold, no lender offers SCr .  
 
d) *CC rr >  
Lenders know that if *CC rr >  the manager invests in project R. Thus, they charge Cr  that solves 
equation 0)1()1(),( =−−++= IEprpIrRE CCL . The solution is [ ]  pIEpIr RC 1/)1( −−−= . The 
interest rate must be incentive compatible and must guarantee a non-negative profit to the manager to be 
feasible. Solving the inequality *CC rr >  for the level of incentive compensation α gives the condition for 
R
Cr  to be incentive compatible: there is a threshold 0
** >Cα such that if 
**
Cαα > , 
*
CC rr > , where 
**
Cα  is 
 
( )
[ ] [ ]IpWEpHqIpWEpZp
Wpqp
C
−−+−−−+
−
=
**α  
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Only when α is above the threshold **Cα  the manager, offered the interest rate 
R
Cr , invests in the risky 
project, and has an expected payoff of [ ]
 0IpWEpZpWrRE RC
M
C >−−++= α),( . If α is lower than 
the threshold, RCr  is not feasible: the manager, offered
R
Cr , invests in the safe project, and bondholders 
have a positive expected profit. However, because public lenders are competitive, another group of 
investors offers the lower rate SCr  , and the manager accepts the offer and invests in project S 
because ),(),( RCMCSCMC rRErSE >   Thus, if α is lower than the threshold, no lender offers RCr .  
 
Part 2: Final Outcomes 
It can be readily shown that **** CNCNC ααα << .  For simplicity I assume that 
*****
NCCNC ααα << . If 
******
CCNCNC αααα <<<  the final result does not change. If 
**
NCαα < only two interest rates are feasible, 
S
NCr  and 
S
Cr . Simple calculations show that ),(),( SCMCSNCMNC rSErSE > : thus, for **NCαα < , the 
backwards-induction outcome is ( )SNCrS , . For **** CNC ααα <<  the feasible interest rates are SNCr , SCr  and 
R
NCr . Because ),(),( SCMCSNCMNC rSErSE > , the relevant comparison is between ),( SNCMNC rSE  and 
),( RNCMNC rRE . It can be shown that ),(),( RNCMNCSNCMNC rRErSE > : thus, for **** CNC ααα << , the backwards-
induction outcome is ( )SNCrS , . For *** NCC ααα <<  the feasible interest rates are SNCr , SCr ,  RNCr , and RCr . 
Because ),(),( SCMCSNCMNC rSErSE >  and ),(),( RCMCRNCMNC rRErRE >  , the relevant comparison is again 
between ),( SNCMNC rSE  and ),( RNCMNC rRE : thus, for *** NCC ααα << , the backwards-induction outcome is 
( )SNCrS , . If ** CNC ααα <<  the feasible interest rates are SCr , RCr  and RNCr . Because 
),(),( RCMCRNCMNC rRErRE > , the relevant comparison is between ),( SCMC rSE  and ),( RNCMNC rRE . Given the 
model parametric assumptions, it can be shown that ),(),( RNCMNCSCMC rRErSE > : thus, for ** CNC ααα <<  
the backwards-induction outcome is ( )SCrS , . Finally, for *Cαα > , the only feasible interest rates are RNCr  
and RCr . Because ),(),( RCMCRNCMNC rRErRE > , the backwards induction outcome for this case is ( )RNCrR, . 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2. The manager invests in the safe project only if investing in S maximizes his expected 
profit. Thus, the manager solves the inequalities ),( ),( rRErSE MNCMNC >  ( ),( ),( rRErSE MCMC > ) for the 
interest rate r. Without collateral, that is equivalent to solving 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]rIWZEppW rIWHEqqW +−−++−−>+−−++−− 1111 αφξφαξ  
 
If the bond is collateralized the inequality becomes 
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]rIWZEpW prIWHEqqW +−−++>+−−++ 11 αφφα  
 
Solving the inequalities for r leads to Lemma 2. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. This proof has two parts: first I analyze all the feasible outcomes given the 
manager’s reaction function; then I study which outcome prevails for different levels of incentive 
compensationα . 
 
Part 1: Feasible Outcomes 
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a) *NCNC rr <  
The bank knows that, if *NCNC rr < , the manager invests in project S, and the signal is S with probability 1. 
Thus, the bank solves 0))(1()1(),( =−−−+−++= cIWEqrqIrSE NCNCL ξ  for NCr . The solution is 
[ ]
 qIWEqcIr SNC 1/))(1( −−+−−+= ξ .  To be feasible, the interest rate must be incentive compatible 
and must guarantee a non-negative profit to the manager. SNCr  is incentive compatible only if 
*
NCNC rr < . 
Solving the inequality for the level of incentive compensation α gives the condition for SNCr  to be 
incentive compatible: there is a threshold *NCα such that if 
*
NCαα < ,  
*
NCNC rr <  with  
 
( )
( )[ ] ( )[ ]cIWqEqHqcIWqEqZp
pqq
NC
−−−−++−−−−−++
−
= ξξφ
ξφ
α
11
*
 
 
Only when α is below the threshold *NCα  the manager, offered the interest rate 
S
NCr , invests in the safe 
project. His expected payoff is [ ]
 0cIWqEqHqWrSE SNC
M
NC >−−−−+++−−= ξαξ )1()1(),( .  If 
α is above the threshold *NCα , 
S
NCr  is not feasible: the manager facing a rate of 
S
NCr  invests in the risky 
project and the bank expected profit is negative. Thus, for α greater than the threshold, no bank offers 
S
NCr .  
 
b) *NCNC rr >  
The bank knows that, if *NCNC rr > , the manager invests in project R, and the signal is S with probability 
φ  and R with probability φ−1 . Thus, the bank charges the interest rate NCr  that solves the following 
equation:  
 
[ ] ( )( ) 01))(1()1(),( =−+−−+−−−+−++= cWEcIWEprpIrRE NCNCL ξφξφ  
 
The solution is [ ]
 pIWEpcIr RNC 1/))(1( −−+−−+= φξφφ . As before, to be feasible the interest rate 
must be incentive compatible and guarantee a non-negative profit to the manager. RNCr  is incentive 
compatible only if *NCNC rr > . Solving the inequality for the level of incentive compensation α gives the 
condition for RNCr  to be incentive compatible: there is a threshold 
**
NCα  such that if 
**
NCαα > , 
*
NCNC rr >  
where **NCα  is 
 
( )
( )[ ] ( )[ ]cIWpEpHqcIWpEpZp
pqp
NC
−−−−++−−−−−++
−
= φξφφφξφφφ
ξφφ
α
11
**
 
 
Only when α is above the threshold **NCα  the manager, offered the interest rate 
R
NCr , invests in the risky 
project. [ ]
 0cIWpEpZpWrRE RNC
M
NC >−−−−+++−−= φξφφαξφ )1()1(),(  is the manager’s 
expected payoff. If α is below the threshold, RNCr  is not feasible.  The manager invests in the safe project 
and the bank has a positive expected profit. However, because banks are competitive, another group of 
investors offers the lower rate SNCr , and the manager accepts the offer and invests in project S because 
),(),( RNCMNCSNCMNC rRErSE >   Thus, if α is below the threshold, no bank offers RNCr .  
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c) *CC rr <  
The bank knows that if *CC rr <  the manager invests in project S and that the signal is S with probability 
1. Thus, the bank solves 0)1()1(),( =−−−++= cIEqrqIrSE CCL for the interest rate Cr . The 
solution is [ ]
 qIEqcIr SC 1/)1( −−−+= . To be feasible, the interest rate must be incentive compatible 
and must guarantee a non-negative profit to the manager. Solving the inequality *CC rr <  for the level of 
incentive compensation α gives the condition for SCr  to be incentive compatible: there is a threshold 
*
Cα such that if 
*
Cαα < , 
*
CC rr <  where 
*
Cα  is 
 
( )
[ ] [ ]cIqWEqHqcIqWEqZp
Wpqq
C
−−−+−−−−+
−
= φ
φ
α *  
 
Only when α is below the threshold *Cα  the manager, offered the interest rate 
S
Cr , invests in the safe 
project, and has an expected payoff of [ ]
 0cIqWEqHqWrSE SC
M
C >−−−++= α),( . If α is greater 
than the threshold *Cα  , 
S
Cr  is not feasible: the manager facing a rate of 
S
Cr  invests in the risky project and 
the bank expected profit is negative. Thus, for α greater than the threshold, no bank offers SCr .  
 
d) *CC rr >  
The bank knows that if *CC rr >  the manager chooses to invest in project R. In that case they know the 
signal is S with probability φ  and R with probability φ−1 . Thus, they need to find the interest rate NCr  
that solves the following equation:  
 
[ ] ( )( ) 01)1()1(),( =−−+−−−++= cEcIEprpIrRE CCL φφ  
 
The solution is [ ]
 pIEpcIr RC 1/)1( −−−+= φφφ . The interest rate must be incentive compatible and 
must guarantee a non-negative profit to the manager to be feasible. Solving the inequality *CC rr >  for the 
level of incentive compensation α gives the condition for RCr  to be incentive compatible: there is a 
threshold **Cα such that if 
**
Cαα > , 
*
CC rr >  where 
**
Cα  is 
 
( )
[ ] [ ]cIpWEpHqcIpWEpZp
Wpqp
C
−−−+−−−−+
−
= φφφφφφφ
φφ
α **  
 
Only when α is above the threshold **Cα  the manager, offered the interest rate 
R
Cr , invests in the risky 
project, and has an expected payoff of [ ]
 0cIpWEpZpWrRE RC
M
C >−−−++= φϕφαϕ),( . If α is 
below the threshold, RCr  is not feasible. The manager invests in the safe project and the bank has a 
positive expected profit. However, because banks are competitive, another bank offers the lower rate SCr  
and the manager accepts the offer and invests in project S because ),(),( RCMCSCMC rRErSE >   Thus, if α 
is below the threshold, no bank offers RCr .  
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Part 2: Final Outcomes 
It can be readily shown that **** CNCNC ααα << .  For simplicity I assume that 
*****
NCCNC ααα << . If 
******
CCNCNC αααα <<<  the final result does not change. If 
**
NCαα < only two interest rates are feasible, 
S
NCr  and 
S
Cr . Simple calculations show that ),(),( SCMCSNCMNC rSErSE > : thus, for **NCαα < , the 
backwards-induction outcome is ( )SNCrS , . For **** CNC ααα <<  the feasible interest rates are SNCr , SCr  and 
R
NCr . Because ),(),( SCMCSNCMNC rSErSE > , the relevant comparison is between ),( SNCMNC rSE  and 
),( RNCMNC rRE . It can be shown that ),(),( RNCMCSNCMNC rRErSE > : thus, for **** CNC ααα << , the backwards-
induction outcome is ( )SNCrS , . For *** NCC ααα <<  the feasible interest rates are SNCr , SCr ,  RNCr , and RCr . 
Because ),(),( SCMCSNCMNC rSErSE >  and ),(),( RCMCRNCMNC rRErRE > , the relevant comparison is again 
between ),( SNCMNC rSE  and ),( RNCMNC rRE : thus, for *** NCC ααα << , the backwards-induction outcome is 
( )SNCrS , . If ** CNC ααα <<  the feasible interest rates are SCr , RCr  and RNCr . Because 
),(),( RCMCRNCMNC rRErRE > , the relevant comparison is between ),( SCMC rSE  and ),( RNCMNC rRE . Given the 
parametric assumptions, it can be shown that ),(),( RNCMNCSCMC rRErSE > : for ** CNC ααα <<  the 
backwards-induction outcome is ( )SCrS , . Finally, for *Cαα > , the only feasible interest rates are RNCr  and 
R
Cr . Because ),(),( RCMCRNCMNC rRErRE > , the backwards induction outcome for this case is ( )RNCrR, . 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. It can be easily shown that, for a small monitoring cost c, **** CNCCNC αααα <<<  
if  0* >Cα . This is equivalent to the condition: 
 
cIqWEqH
cIqWEqZ
p
q
−−−+
−−−+
<φ  
 
 To prove Proposition 3, I compare the manager’s payoffs for each backwards-induction outcome. If  
*
NCαα < , the feasible outcomes are ),( SNCrS with public debt and ),( SNCrS with bank debt. Thus I compare 
the manager’s expected payoffs: 
 
[ ] [ ] cIWqEqHqWIWqEqHqW −−−−+++−−>−−−+++−− ξαξξαξ )1()1()1()1(  
 
Then, for *NCαα < , ),(),( SNCMNCSNCMNC rSErSE >  and the final outcome is ),( SNCrS . If ** CNC ααα <<  the 
feasible outcomes are ),( SCrS with public debt and ),( SNCrS with bank debt. Thus I compare the 
manager’s expected payoffs: 
 
[ ] [ ] cIWqEqHqWIqWEqHqW −−−−+++−−<−−++ ξαξα )1()1(  
  
The inequality is true for small c. Thus, for ** CNC ααα << , ),(),( SNCMNCSCMNC rSErSE < , and the final 
outcome is ),( SNCrS . If ** NCC ααα <<  the feasible outcomes are ),( RNCrR with public debt and 
),( SNCrS with bank debt. I compare the manager’s expected payoffs: 
 
[ ] [ ] cIWqEqHqWIWpEpZpW −−−−+++−−<−−−+++−− ξαξξαξ )1()1()1()1(  
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The inequality is true for small c. Thus, for ** NCC ααα << , ),(),( SNCMNCRNCMNC rSErRE < , and the final 
outcome is again ),( SNCrS . If ** CNC ααα <<  the feasible outcomes are ),( RNCrR with public debt and 
),( SCrS with bank debt. I compare the manager’s expected payoffs: 
 
[ ] [ ] cIqWEqHqWIWpEpZpW −−−++<−−−+++−− αξαξ )1()1(  
 
The inequality is true for small c. Thus, for ** CNC ααα << , ),(),( SCMCRNCMNC rSErRE < , and the final 
outcome is ),( SCrS . Finally, for *Cαα >  the feasible outcomes are ),( RNCrR with public debt and 
),( RNCrR with bank debt. I compare the manager’s expected payoffs: 
 
[ ] [ ]cIWpEpZpWIWpEpZpW −−−−+++−−>−−−+++−− φξφφαξφξαξ )1()1()1()1(  
 
The inequality is always true. Thus, for *Cαα > , ),(),( RNCMCRNCMNC rRErRE >  and ),( RNCrR  is the final 
outcome. Outcome ),( RNCrR  is feasible only if the probability of detecting a violation of the loan covenant 
is low, and the condition on pq φ/ is satisfied. If the signal is very precise ( pq φ/ is above the threshold), 
then **** NCCNCC αααα <<< , the outcome ),( SCrS  is always feasible, and the comparison is again between 
),( SCrS  and ),( RNCrR . If that is the case, the final outcome for *NCαα >  is ),( SCrS . Q.E.D. 
 
